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I. The Fonnation of '(he Executive Cotmcil .,, .. 
On May 10, 1776, John Adams introdu~ed a resolution in the Conti-
nental Congress encouraging those colonies tlia t had not yet adopted 
governments ''sufficie11t to the exegencies of their affairs" to institute 
that kind of government "as sha~l in the opinion of the- representatives 
of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their con-
stituents in particular,- and America in general." 1 It was the passage 
of this resolution which initiated the action of substituting the Con-
stitution of 1776 for the Charter of 1701 by the radical Whig element in 
Permsylvania. 
This was not the first attempt to change the frame of government, a 
singularly derrocratic fonn which existed for a long time in a monarchial 
world that feared democracy as mob rule. Just before the passage of the 
Stamp Act in 1764, Benjamin Franklin had been sent to England to seek a 
royal charter to replace the proprietary fonn of goverrnnent. This action 
did not succeed for two reasons. The first was the Stamp Act which showed 
the colonists the temper of the govenunent in England. The second was 
the misgivings that grew in the minds of many who had originally favored 
a change. Jolm Dickinson foresaw the establishment of a state church 
and the imposition of a standing anny if Pennsylvania became a royal 
colony. Both of these were ana thena to a province founded and built on 
freedom anJ toleration. 2 
One thing this unsuccessful move did accomplish was to show· in, 
~· ':' 
,I 
1 Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, (Madison, 1963) 98 •.. 
2 Jolm Dickinson, A Speech Delivered in the Assembly, (Philadelphia, 1764) N. P. 
:: 
clearer detail the political composition of the province. The frontier 
population was composed of a large vocal group of Scotch-Irish Presby-
terians and a minority group of less vocal Gennans. The fonner group 
sought _during the next decade to increase their representation by the 
addition of Assemblymen from the~r a~ea and the organization of new 
... .---/ 
coW1ties. Their aim was to gain greater i11ternal improvements and more 
protection from the Indian on whose territory they constantly encroacl1e<i • ., 
'!heir pleas fell on deaf ears and some of the more politically sophis-
ticated concerned themselves with the question of the constitutionality 
of English law and the infringement of that law on the rights of the 
colonists. The frontiersmen were not concerned with abstract discussion, 
but with wl1at they felt were the practical aspects of daily life and work. 
ti'·· 
By the time of John Adams' resolution, three distinct political 
groups had been fonned in the Province. The largest seemed to be that 
group which repres·ented the frontier farmer and the urban artisan. There 
were few actual spokesmen from the frontier, but men such as George Bryan, 
a lawyer and a Philadelphian, quickly moved to become their spokesman. 
James Cannon, a Philadelphia teacher, was the most ardent spokesman for 
the artisans. The principal dissatisfaction of this group was less with 
the way they were being treated by England than with the v.ray they were not 
gi,ven consideration by the Provincial Assembly. 
The second group consisted: o.f the bulk of the educated and many in 
___ illl ____________ _;_ __ .-_.---.. __,.J····,:1~:.r,~·--.,c···.-----~ -
\. 
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the upper economic group. Tl1eir principal complaint was fotmded on the 
lack of agreement as to what England had a right to impose on the colonies. 
They sougl1t concession through discussion and were reluctant to take the 
•· final step that would sever ties with an English ~onstitution that, to them, 
was flexible enough to allow them tl1eir vie,~ without a radical change in 
relationsl1ip. Jolm Dickinson and Thomas Willing were leaders in· this group. 
The last and most conservative element in the political spectrum was 
composed of the nLD11erous Quakers, who were inclined to withdraw from poli-
tics at this point, and the pro-Englisl1 group who were in a decided minority. 
Joseph Galloway led many of this group into English exile. 
David Lloyd, political leader in 1701, had been adament in his demands 
on William Perm that the Frame of Government include a llllicameral legis-
• 
lature, tl1e rigl1t to choose its own officers and of self adjourrunent, the 
right to set up and appoint its own connnittees, to prepare bills and to judge 
the qualifications of its O\.vn members, and the right to request the redress 
of grievances. While the Assembly could not override the Governor's or 
Deputy-Governor's veto, it did possess the singular power to withhold sala-
. 
ries, thus forcing the executive to accede its wishes. It was the carrot 
• 
and stick teclmique and was used effectively. J\nother significant feature 
was the provision for a Govenior's·Council to advise and assist the Governor, 
but whici1 could not offer advice or assistance to the Assembly. 3 
Most of these points were incorporated in the new Constitution, but the 
3 Roy N. Lokken, David Lloyd, Colonial Lawmaker, (Seattle, 1959) Chap. 7, 
.... 
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one we are most concerned with is that which was called the Governor's 
Cowicil in the Frame of 1701, and the Suprane Executive Council in the 
. ~ 
new fundamental law. This group would be a plural executive replacing 
the Governor and restricted to carrying out the will of the Assembly. 
Thus, much of the status quo was maintained. Many of the articles of 
· the new Constitution were conservative features included by an eclectic 
radical group to serve its own ends. 
-·----·· 
,'· 
~: 
One wonders why so much of the old Frame was incorporated into the 
new Constitution if the old government was not "sufficient to the ex-
egencies of its affairs." There had seemed to be less dissatisfaction 
with the fundamental law than with those who were elected to carry it 
out. It was the representatives of the frontier population coupled with 
those delegated by the urban mechanics who were detennined that there had 
to be a change in the gover1nnental body if not in the fonn. 
There were, however, elements in the new Constitution which are 
frequently overlooked, or are mentioned only in passing. Perhaps we can 
account for this by the tendency of some historians to give greater 
credence than is warranted to the idea that this was a culmination of a 
long struggle between the frontier counties, seeking a greater voice in 
the affairs of the province, and the more populous, sophisticated eastern 
counties seeking to maintain their hold on the govenunent. 
Charles Lincoln developed the thesis that there was little opportunity 
., 
I 
.1 
·.·I 
i 
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I 
I 
• •. J 
i 
.... ;,;, -,· 
• for democracy in goven1Jnent in the frontier area owing to the strangle-
......... 
hold of the wealthy eastern cotmties upon the Assembly. He believed that 
. ,J, 
the outbreak of hostilities between the colonies and England provided an 
opportunity for the frontier population to initiate some revolutionary 
action of their own. The peripheral areas had been underrepresented in 
the Assembly, and it \vas the spokesmen for this group, fonning part of 
the radical Whig party, that corrected this misbalance in 1776. But 
whether these men sought the full franchise, as Lincoln in part argues, 
is questionable. 4 A careful review indicates that while this may have 
been true, there were other areas of discontent. Another historian has 
suggested that the frontier counties were able to· achieve their goal only 
because of aid provided by the mechanics and artisans of Philadelphia. 
The urban group, finding the property qualification a serious drawback in 
exercising their franchise rights, was as interested in the individual vote 
as the frontier was in equality of representation. The merger of spokesmen 
for this group with the frontier representatives was to provide the necessary 
strengtl1 to write and implement the Constitution. 5 
'Iwo students of American suffrage give more weight to the Thayer view 
than to the Lincoln thesis. \\Then the Frame of Gover1nnent was accepted in 
1701, the franchise was probably deliberately limited, but by the second 
half of the century, frontiersmen could have met the fifty acre property 
qualification with much greater ease than his earlier collllterpart •. This is 
4 Charles Lincoln, The Revolutionary ~·fovernent in Pe1U1Sylvania, 1760-1776, (Philadelphia, 1901). · ., 
5 Theodore Thayer, Peruis~lvania Politics and The Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776, (1-Iarrisburg, 1 53) 6. 
~-
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borne out by McKinley's evidence that one in two was able to meet the 
property qualification in the coW1try, while only ijone in ten in the city 
was enfranchised. 6 
In essence tl1en, each group, seeking its own ends was able to 
provide support to the other. These radical l\Thigs became kno\.vll as the 
Constitution Party, supporting it against all attacks by the more moderate 
Whigs, or Anti-Constitutionalists, ,vho felt the document penni tted unre-
stricted license by the n1ore numerous constitutionalists. 7 
'Ibe new Constitution enlarged the franchise and gave to the frontier 
Q counties the equality of representation.they desired. Because of this 
' 
equality, the Assembly became a reflection of the frontier, being weighted 
with members from the more numerous western counties with similar interests. 
· The Constitution provided tliat, until an adequate list of taxables was 
available and agreed upon, each cotmty would elect six Assembly men. When 
the list of taxables became available, the westeni counties were forced to 
give up some of their representation due to an insufficient nt.m1ber of 
taxables, but they were still able to maintain their numerical superiority. 8 
t 
6 Chilton Williamson, 
.... .,.....~,...,..~!l""t'-~"'"'-1=---:~-rr-~----=-~..,,.,.--~-..,...-l86 Q, (Princeton, ; ert • ~1cK1nley, in the 1,birteen Colonies, (Philadelphia, 1905) 292. 
7 During the period just prior to the adoption of the Constitution and con-tinuing throughout the whole revolutionary period a variety of labels was attached to these two groups. The Radical lvhigs were called Radicals, Furious \\Thigs, Democrats and Constitutionalists among other names. The 
~- ·, . ,., , Moderate Vfuigs ivere pictured as Conservatives, l\1oderates, Republicans or Constitutionalists, and the opponents of the Constitution will be referred to as Anti-Constitutionalists, Republicans, or Conservatives. 
8 Pennsylvania Packet, December 29, 1785. 
;' .~ 
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The argument that the Constitution of 1776 was · a direct result of 
demands for an enlarged franchise and greater representation seems an 
oversimplification. Certainly, the frontiersmen were fearful that the 
economic interest of the east would place restrictions and qualifications 
on their demands. Their objective was to effect a government that would 
provide maximtun leverage for themselves with a minimum of opposition. 
Aside from the Bill of Rights, which guaranteed certain freedoms, there 
was little in the new Constitution that was revolutionary. For that matter, 
many of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights had been understood by both 
the proprietors and the people even though unwritten by the provincial 
government. No episode such as the exiling of the Quakers to Virginia took 
place under the proprietorship. Obviously, the Quakers, when ~hey "'~~~d 
) the colony, would not have exiled themselves, but there seemed to be a 
greater respect for the writ of habeas c6rpus. 
The Supreme Executive Council was composed of one representative from 
each county and from the city of Philadelphia. This body would be presided 
over by a President, elected in a joint session of the Assembly and the 
Cotmcil, but his jurisdiction was to be no greater than that of any other 
member. In essence, he was primus inter pares in the view of the Constitution .. 
makers. As the new government developed, he was in fact sanething more. The 
very title lent to him a dignity and respect that no other member could 
conunand. Almost without exception, he was chosen for his leadership qual-
. . . .. 
I 
": 
-s-
·-·-· 
ities, and in many instances was a person who wielded considerable influence 
in the colD1cils of govenunent. 
It is ~e purpose-of this paper to investigate how well the Constitution~s 
provisions concerning the Cotmcil worked in practice. Was the Cowicil merely 
a group of automatons only working on legislation passed by the legislature? 
In the light of changes in the govenunent due to changes of parties in power, 
could a Radical Cotmcil carry out a conservative program ,vi th equanimity, 
and could a Conservative Council overcome the temptation to read newly passed 
legislation in a variety of ways to suit its own purposes? The Cowicil was 
a unique body, by its nature beset with almost insunnotmtable problems. It 
seriously attempted to combat nm.away inflation, incite the people to greater 
sacrifices during the war, overcome problems caused by settlers from other 
states who laid claim to PeIU1Sylvania territory, and in general attempted to 
promote the well-being of the Cornnonwealth within the confines of a funda-
mental law about which many of the citizens were in disagreement. 
The sections of the Constitution referring specifically to the Council 
were brief, leaving a vast tmcharted area. The Council members were chosen 
in a fashion similar to the election of United State Senators. The maximt.nn 
tenn was three years and one third 6£ the Council retired each year. The 
reasoning behind this was stated in Section 19: " • • • business will be more 
· conveniently conducted, and moreover the danger of establishing an inconvenient 
,, 
Aristocracy will be effectually prevented.'' The fear of an: "Aristocracy" \ 
.',··· 
I· 
I 
! 
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was very real to the delegates from the western counties in 1776, and 
persisted when Philadelphia sought home rule, and later when the Federal 
Constitution was debated. 9 
The Constitution further provided that l'lhen one was chosen Councillor, 
he could not serve in any other elective or appointive capacity. His 
time was spent solely on the greater business of the Commonwealth. A · 
Councillor was, however, a Commonwealth justice of the peace by virtue of 
his election. The Council was responsible for the appointment of the 
attorney-general, judges, county lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, and 
naval officers, together with any other civil officers it found necessary 
to appoint. This placed a great deal of political patronage in the hands 
of the Council, but when the Legislature felt that there was an undue 
'amount of power in tl1e hands of th~ Council, it was quick to arrange a 
transfer of some of the appointments to itself. 1~ Sections 20 and 22 
provided for impeachment proceedings whic11 were not unique in themselves, 
but with the Council acting as judge, the Assembly could impeach persons 
no longer connected with the Government owing to removal or resignation if 
it felt there was reason for such proceedings. 
\. 
,•. 1 
Many men in the metropolitan centers of the fonner colonies were 
familiar with the political theories of Locke and ~·lontesquieu. They were 
also acquainted with the more radical position of Rousseau, and while most 
of the newly independent States adopted constitutions more in keeping with 
9 
''Tam Peep", Independent Gazeteer, January 10, 1788. 
IO Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790, (Harrisburg, 1942) 118. 
> 
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the vie,vs of the fonner, Pennsylvania opted for some of the ideas of the 
latter when it gave the ultimate sovereignity to the people as a whole. 
This had a certain advantage for the hydra-headed Council in that, as a 
multiple executive, they were less liable to criticism than would be a 
single executive. 11 -~ 
One final note on the Constitution deserves some attention. The: 
_document provided for an independent body known as the Council of Censors 
to meet every seven years for the purpose of detennining if legislation 
approved during the preceding seven years had been constitutional, and 
what improvements could be made in the charter. Because of the responsi-
bilities given the Censors and the built-in limitations upon change, it 
was early predicted that few improvements would be made. 12 The success 
of the Constitution depended not on those who wrote it, for they could be 
expected to support it. Because of tl1e lack of a large majority expressing. 
either a Radical or Conservative point of view, success depended on the 
moderates who held the balance of power. That many of the moderates with-
drew from active support or a~tive opposition was qeplored by Charles . . 
Thomson, who argued that had this group been ·more vocal there would not 
have been the party strife that prevailed for the next ten years. 13 
Finally, the Council of Censors exercised a function not Wllike the present 
day judicial review of our Supreme Court. Fully as much controversy 
surrounded the Council of Censors as surroW1ds the conteniporary Court. 
11 Pennsylvania Evening Post, July 30, 1776.-
12 Burton A. Konkle, Geor@e B'Efan and the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1731-1790 (Philadelp11ia, 922) l28-l29. . 
13 Lewis R. Harley, Life of Charles Thomson (Philadelphia, 1900) 79-81. 
-11-
The adoption of the Constitution.created problems which were not\ 
foreseen by the framers when they met. Because of the lack of a sufficient. 
number of elected Cowicillors, or the wiwillingness of some of those 
elected to serve because the oath of office compromised them, there was 
no Supreme Executive Council at the 'beginning of the Constitutional period. 
To fill the gap, the previously appointed Cotmcil of Safety acted in this 
capacity. On the whole, many of these men were of the Radical persuasion, 
~ but they were more concerned with the prosecution of the war than with the 
internal pr~~tems of a State torn by dissension. When the first militia 
law was enacted, the Cotmcil of Safety ordered the schools "broke up" and 
· tl1e constituents were to provide conti11ual defense for the city of 
Philadelphia. 14 
The difficulty in electing a full Council was~not due solely to the 
1• •, 
refusal of many responsible men to serve because of the need to subscribe to 
tl1e oath. Many men of influence were participating in the larger sphere of 
the war. This pennitted men like James Caru1on, David Rittenhouse, Thomas 
~ne and George Bryan to play out" their roles as Radicals and urge the 
.. 
election of men of their party who were willing to serve. Finally, in March, 
1777, a full Cotmcil was elected, and in a joint meeting with the Assembly 
elected'Thomas Wharton, Jr, President and George Bryan Vice-President of 
the Council. Wharton, a moderate Constitutionalist, accepted the office 
and the Constitution as the best that could be had. However, any change in 
14 Journals of the House of Re resentatives of the Conmonwealth of Penns 1-
... 
.::, •• ·:··.·: .... • o, .'·. 
. ·• ·,. 
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government that was more in keeping with the ideas of the Conservatives · 
or Anti-Constitutionalists ,vould have found him receptive. His greatest 
desire was the prevention of anarchy, and cooperation with.the Constitu-
tionalist forces was his \\Tay of accomplishing this. 15 
' 
The problems the newly organized Council faced seemed insunnountable. 
Even before they fonnally met, the Army faced · serious food shortages. 
Because of tl1e difficulty in transporting grain to market, fanners con-
verted their wheat and corn into the less cumbersome and more transport-
able whiskey. So much was being distilled in York Cotmty that it appeared 
there would be a shortage of bread. Shortly thereafter, the CoW1cil of 
Safety was so short on funds that supplies could not be paid for.. Thei;r 
request to the Assembly for money ,vas sent to tl1e .Executive Council with 
· $ 16· the recounnenda tion that an application be made to t·he Congress for 100,000. 
Shortly after the Council ~as fonnally organized, they agreed that some 
group with more military experience should be convened to give closer 
_atteniion to the war.· Most of the members had no prior military experience, 
and _the civilian responsibilities of the Cotn1cil were going to be great 
enough without assuming the additional burden of overseeing the war. There 
followed the first instance of interpretation of the new Constitution to 
• 15 Elisha Douglass, Rebels and Democrats (Chapel Hill, 1955) 262; Wharton to Arthur St. Clair, n. a. in Anna ~'I. 'Wharton, "Thomas ifuarton, Jr.'' Pennsylvania i'-1agazi11e of History and Biograpl1y V, 436. 
~6 Journals of Assembly, February 6, 1777, 109; Colonial Records, ~1arch 11, 1777 XI, _178. 
., 
I 
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detennine how much power had been given the Council. I~ was finally 
. 
ll 
-
agreed that they had the necessary power to appoint a Board of War and 
a Navy Board. The specific assignment given these bvo bodies was the 
supervision of the war. They were to report to the Council when they 
felt it necessary. There seemed to be little disagreement on the 
appointments to these conuni ttees, even though the membership ~as drawn I; 
fran the three eastern counties and those contiguous to them. The 
Radical majority in the CoW1cil was forced to agree to these appointments 
because experience was a requisite, and there was a great deal more mili-
tary experience in this area than on the frontier. Thus the Board of l"/ar 
was composed of men who were generally opposed to the policies of the 
Radicals. Even so, they were willing to take the "test oath", which 
proved a stumbling block for the proposed Navy Board. Nine of the ten 
Navy Board appointments refused to take the oath, at the same time pro-
testing tl1eir loyalty and willingness to serve in any capacity without 
the oath. By virtue of the appointments, the Council gave evidence of 
their confidence in the loyalty of the appointees, and this did not seem 
to be questioned even after the refusal of the men to serve if they had 
~ 
to subscribe to the oath. 17 
The test oath, required by the Constitution, was to prove a real 
-problem for Thomas lfuarton during his short tenure as Councillor and 
President. Because the Conservatives who were elected to the Assembly 
17 Ibid., March 14, 1777, XI, 181-183. The records do not disclose the attitude of the CoW1cil. The only clue is the insertion without conunent .of the petition from the appointed Navy Board and the excerpt from the Navy Board minutes. 
I , I .... 
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\ 
threatened to prevent a quorum, an agreement was worked out whereby the 
. 0 
Anti-Constitutionalists lvould attend if tl1e Radicals would respond favor-
ably to a plan for a new convention that would eliminate the oath. . Such 
a convention would also eliminate many of the features which the Conserva~ 
tives f~lt were anathema to their political philosophy. The Assembly 
asked the Colmcil. and the Board of l\/ar to concur in a plan to call· such a 
meeting. There was genuine support for this outside the goveniing circle. 
It was not 1.lllusual to have opponents of the Constitution issue denials to 
charges of disloyalty, and to argue that public offices would not be filled 
by accomplished men if the doctunent were not revised. The Board of lvar so 
accepted the idea of change that they publisl1ed their support with the 
thought that like-minded persons would be attracted and support. the change. 
This was not an wmatural reaction for the Board of War, for it lvas composed 
·Of men molded in the conservative tradition. 18 
The ink was hardly dry on the Assembly's request to Council for their 
support of the measure, when they had second thoughts • They saw the 
possibility of loss of control, or at least reduction of an already tenuous 
control, should the changes sought by the Anti-Constitutionalists come to 
fruition._ As a result, they tried to find a way out of the dilemma. The 
Council, fully aware of the dissatisfaction with the Constitution expressed 
by some, came to the rescue of the Assembly witl1 the suggestion that, as 
qualified representatives of the people, they find some means of pennitting 
18 Journals of Assembly, April 23, 1777, 137; George Canipbell .. to Thomas wharton, Jr., March 30, 1777; Ephriam Blaine to Wharton, April 17 1777; Pennsrlvania Archives, (Harrisburg, 1853) 1st Series, V, 269; Pennsylvania Packet, May 20, 1777. 
.. 
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<' 
the people themselves to decide whether the Constitution was a satis-
... 
factory document. The purpose of this suggestion was to put down with 
finality the arguments of the dissidents who were in opposition, and ,. 
hopefully create a more hannonious atmosphere. The Assembly seized 
.. 
- upon this, fully aware that if the recently enfranchised voters ,vere 
cognizant that a change in the Constitution now would not increase their 
voice in government and would probably reduce it, they could overcome 
any thought of change. They were convinced that the key was not to call 
a convention until it could be learned that there was wid,e:spread dissat-
is.faction. The Conservatives believed that they could. not. overcome this 
'Vieiv at the polls and were reduced to constant opposition without the 
force to really make their claim effective. 19 
Appointing qualified persons to the govennnent positions continued 
to raise problems for the Council. Because of this patronage power, it 
was possible to exercise much more control than had originally been 
anticipated. \vharton and the c·ouncil made many appointments of men who 
refused to take office because of the test oath. In addition to their 
authority of appointing lieutenants, sub-lieutenants, sheriffs and pro-
thonotaries, the Council was authorized by the Assembly to fill the judge---
sl1ips that had just been created to "hold city courts". The Co_1µ1cil 
might appoint a person to a post, but they were generally ignorant of 
how it would be received by the appointee. They didn't know whether it 
19 Colonial Records, June 11, 1777 XI, 224. Journals of Assenbly, June 17, 1111, 146. Brunhouse, 32. ' 
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would be accepted, accepted with qualifications, or refused. Trans-
portation and cononunication were primitive, so it was not unusual for 
Council to be notified of non-acceptance of· an appointment several 
months after it had been made. In the interim, local government fre-
quently did not function, and not infrequently, truces were unpaid for 
long periods. 20 
In March, 1777, George Campbell agreed to accept an appointment as 
Prothonotary of Philadelphia County providing he did not have to com-
promise his principles by acceding to an oath with which he disagreed. 
He was willing to swear his loyalty to the United States and to Penn-
sylvania, but he could not accept the words "as estab-lished by the late 
Constitution". Another accepted an appointment, even while dfs.agreeing 
wi tl1 the mode of government, and then did nothing in his post because 
t 
he did not ,vish anyone to believe that he was reconciled to it. .2l: E.v~n 
Jos·eph Reed vacillated before q.eclining the office of :Chi.ef Justice. 
If an Anti-Constitutionalist was appointed t_o office and then failed 
' to perform as required, the Council ordered him removed and a Radical was· 
appointed in l1is place. The Council tried to exercise · better judgement 
in the second appointment." The displaced official occasionally refused 
to tuni over the records to his successor and this created a great deal 
of acrimony. In July, the patience of the ··council was severely truced. 
Michael l-Ioffnagle had been appointed to office in Westmorelan4 County .and: 
. 
20 Journals of Assembly, March 13, 1777, 128. Brunhouse, 34. 
21 Brunhouse, 34. 
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had been removed by the CoUJ?.cil for inattention to duty. Ile carried 
_the County records with him to Lancaster, and then joined the staff of 
General Washington. The Council requested \tashington to send Hoffnagle 
to Philadelphia to appear before it and ans,ver the charges against him. 
\\'ashington was placed in a difficult position by this request, for a 
refusal to honor the request would alienate Pennsylvania and lose for 
the Continental Anrrt much of the support and supplies currently being 
received. To send l1im back \\10uld mean that l\Tashington, an agent and 
~·. appointee of the Continental Congress, ,vas subordinating himself to one 
sectio~that body. The order availed the Council nothing, and a 
search of Lancaster proved fruitless as well •. Finally in desperation, 
Iioffnagle was ordered arrested and seized to be returned to appear before 
the Council. 22 
Because the Government had to, flee Philadelphia.. -when the British 
. 
occupied it in 1777, the seat of government was: r¢moved to .. Lancaster, which 
prompted even greater transportation problems. Because many Assemblymen 
had difficulty reaching Lancaster, a quorum was impossible. One Radical 
suggested that, because of this, the more democratic elements govern by 
convention. TI1is was clearly tn1constitutional, but the difficult.times 
were cited as justification for the proposal. Ultimately, enough members 
of the Assembly reached Lancaster and the notion was dropped. 
Of more direct relation to the Cotmcil was the breakdown in lo·cal 
22 Colonial Records, July 23, July 26, July 28, 1777 XI, 249, 253-254 • 
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government. In one instance, it was pointed out that the sheriff of 
York County lived thirty miles from the seat of gover1nuent and the 
problem of administering his office was severe. One of the responsi-
bilities of the sheriff was the plarming and execution of the local· 
election as described in· the Constitution. Many other appointees were 
~- not clear about how this should be done, and frequently sought advice 
.. from the Council. In the interim, local goverrunent ceased to function. 23 
f Even with the British invasion of Pennsylvania and the difficulty 
in securing a quorum in Lancaster, state government continued. Roberdeau' s 
suggestion of laws by convention was not instituted, but a compromise solu-
tion was implemented until a quonnn was attained. Full governmental powers 
were taken over by the Council, to which was added eight members of the:: 
~.sembly and the Speaker. This extraordinary body was to act as a Council 
·9_£ Safety until the next election in late October. The Constitution makers 
could not have the foresight to predict such a situation as this, but the 
,· Constitution clearly stated that when the Assanbly was not in session, the 
Cowicil was .to carry out the law, and it seems unlikely that the Council 
< 
would have been unable to do so at this time. The only thing this action 
seems to have accomplished was the illusion of representative goverrnnent. 24 
The frontier elements, democratic in political philosophy, were in 
some instances tmgovernable wiless there was some semblance of democratic 
goverrunent. It is possible that the more experienced foresaw that there 
23 Daniel Roberdeau to Wharton, October 10, 1777, Pennsilvania Archives, Series 1, V, 658-659; Archibald ~tcClean to Georgerya·n, October 11, 1777, Bryan Papers; Robert Levers to Timothy ~1a tlack, l'Jovember 15, 1777; Jacob Morgan to Council, December 1, 1777, Pennsylvania Archives, Series 1, VI, S. 
24 Konkle, 149. 
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might be trouble on the frontier, and gove11unent control of the situation 
would be difficult at best. The state bf affairs in the Connnonwealth was 
so precarious that members of the Assembly were in constant comnwtlcation 
with the Council throughout this period in order to fonnulate policy, to . .. 1 
seek out solutions to state and confederation problems, and in general to 
regulate the government in such a ma.rm.er as would satisfy the constitutional 
requirements. 
1be problem that kept plaguing the Council was one that all govern-
ments have to face when they try to meet the needs of a civilian population 
and also support an anny in the field. This problem of guns or butter began 
early in the 1776-1777 session of the Assenbly and CouncilL;:.:-The increasing 
cost of living had affected everyone. Apparently the consciences· of sane 
of the Assemblymen were stirred, and they proposed a salary increase for 
various conunissioners and assessors, which was to bear sane relation to the 
increased cost of living, but had no fixed fonnula. The Council, learning 
of this shortly after passage, reminded the Assembly that the Justices of 
the Supreme Court had not had their salaries established, and suggested that 
this situation deserved their inunediate attention. Fixed salaries in a 
period of inflation have always been a problem·,· and detennining a specific 
salary for a specific job did little to ease the problem of the individual 
office holder. The lack of specie was more·apparent each day, further aggra-
vating the problem. It became a vicious circle from which the Assembly was 
unable to escape, in part due to the inexperience of the members. 25 
25 Journals of .Assembly, March 18, March 19, 1777, 130-132. 
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IXiring this period, the Council initiated two actions designed to 
alleviate the inflation, and to quell the clamor for punitive action 
against those who were thought to be profiteers. To the back country 
patriot, inflation was tied to speculation, and anyone who speculated was 
an enemy of the Govenunent. Both the Assanbly and the Cotmcil were opposed 
to profiteering in the sale of clothing, food, gunpowder or any of the 
other necessities, and were constantly on the alert to prevent it. The 
accoW1ts of the State were checked frequently by the Council, or if they 
were unable to do this for one reason or another, it was their custom to 
.:J 
appoint a,kind of watchdog to handle the appropriated funds·and.the way 
they were spent. The Council did not object to a modest profit, but did 
feel that excessive profits created an undue strain on the Treasury and 
hardship . for the local consumer \iho l1ad to pay an inordinately high price 
for a basic COITiilodity such as grain. Aside from their interest in the 
welfare of all of the populace, there was another good reason for Council's 
concern. ivfany of the men who served the State in the Cotmcil, the Assembly, 
or the Congress had contacts in the mercantile world, which were needed to 
provide either trading knowledge or merchandise.. This was the kind of 
dilenuna that the Council tried to avoid and found difficult to solve. 
There was a reluctance to associate with the merchant class because of an 
inboni Radical suspicion of anyone who might be part of the monied class. 
i ./ It should be pointed out, however, that many who served as middle men 
in the transfer of goods between initial seller and ultimate user were· in- J).Q: 
) 
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way connected with the Government, and they sought and found opportunities 
to speculate and profit from the traffic in necessities. It was not un-
usual to find an Amer·ican merchant entering into a partnership with a 
Spaniard or Frenchman for the purpose of trade or privateering. Robert 
Morris was among this group, but he was only one of many. ~Iorris was alert 
1 to every opportunity, and when he agreed to take on the task of finances 
for the goveTilIIlent, he stipulated that he would not give up any business_ 
ventures, but would continue to pursue them. At one point, he was assoc-
iated with William Turnbull who was flour purchaser for Pennsylvania in 1779. 
From this it was but a sl1ort· step for Morris to enter this business as both 
buyer and seller. Flour was such an important conmodity that it was not 
W1usual to find private purchasers competing successfully with the Govern-
. rnent buyer to secure adequate supplies for export. Profits from these 
merchant ventures were frequently invested in Loan Office .certific:ates ,a.t 
their depreciated value. 26 
Many members of the merchant class continued to operate as they had 
before the revolution. Chaloner and White, Philadelphia exporters, reported ' 
that in the year irranediately following the British evacuation of Philadelphia, 
one hundred and twenty-one cargo-laden vessels weighed anchor. Some mer-
chants evaded regulations prohibiting the export of needed i terns, and flour 
especially was occasionally shipped on a false manifest. 27 
Flour was in extremely short supply in 1778 and 1779, and it wa's ·estim-
26 Robert A. East, Business Ente~rise in the American Revolutionary L--ra (New York, 1938) l26~l48. 
· 
27 Ibid., 151. 
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ated that in the latter year 46 ,OOO barrels of flour ground from grain 
grown in 1778 would be needed for the troops. This alone opened the way 
for widespread speculation along the whole eastern seaboard. 28 Just as 
the knowledge gained from governing would be beneficial to the Radicals 
later in the period, so the so-call,ed public service of many of, the mer-
chants was to be a business education for some who would use this lmowledge 
of speculating to further their own ends after the war. 29 Some of the 
merchants did not deny they were benefi tting, but at the same time counter-
ed with the argument that they were perfonning a public service. The 
Gover1llnent and many private individuals lvere quick to cite and attack 
politically those merchants who adopted this position •. 30 
1, The first of the actions taken .by the CoW1cil was the institution of 
price controls. "Wheat, being a basic connnodity, was not to be sold above 
a certain fixed price set by the Council. The objective was noble- -to . 
eliminate profiteering in an economy t:ha.t was hard-pressed for sound ·money:• 
The difficultyi lay in the inability of the Council to enforce the edict. 
TI1e stated sale price ,vould presumably pennit the grower to realize a ·· ·. 
profit, but complaints were soon heard that each person who ,vas a part of 
the economic picture tried to increase his profit above the pennissible 
amonnt, which prompted others bent on making a quick fortune tQ enter the 
market. Finally, the grower was refusing to sell his wheat unless he 
secured a greater amount than was allowed. 
28 Ibid., 153. 
29 Ibid., 156-157. 
30 Ibid., 159. 
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tion prompted each person in the process to seek an amount that would 
fairly compensate l1iin for this depreciation. The Assanbly ultimately 
repealed the price regulations, but .~1e wheat and forage problems were 
not alleviated by a free market. The Commissary of Forage appealed to 
the Council to initia~e some means of guaranteeing adequate supplies. 
Anthony Wayne, concerned primarily with the supply problem from the .• . 
Army standpoint, charged that the Council and the Assembly were refusing 
to take their responsibilities seriously 11hen they wrangled politically 
and did nothing to assist the Army in the field. This, of course, was. 
an Wlfair charge in the light of the Council's efforts. 31 
The other action taken by the Cotmcil was one that wa·-$ ptrrsued wi:th ··· 
greater success throughout the war. This was the conf·ist~tion of property 
belonging to suspected Loyalists. Prior to the Brit-ish occupation of 
Philadelphia, the Assembly empowered- the Council to arrest suspected 
persons and to suspend the right to a writ of habeas c6rpus for a limited 
time. It is curious that the Constitution, into which had been written a 
long Bill of Rights, would pennit the suspension of such a b·asic and 
important freedom. There was no recourse to the Courts. That feeling on 
the question of the Loyalists ran high in the Assembly can be attested to 
by the speed with which the legislation was approved. \\Ti thin 24 hours, the 
bill had passed. three readings and was engrossed by tl1e Speaker. 32 
. \ Shortly. thereafter, the Council enlarged its authority granted in the· 
31 William Buchanan to Wharton, November 24, 1777, Clement Biddle to tl/harton, December 14, 1777, Anthony l~ayne to \\Tharton, November 22, 1777, Penn-sylvania Archives, 1st Series VI, 34, 92-93, 25. 
32 Journals of Assembly, September 15, September 16, 1777. 
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legislation, not only to confiscate the property of suspected Tories, but . 
to arrest them as well. The Cotn1cil was specific in the actions it planned 
to take, but found the general public only partially sympathetic to their 
position. The public felt that sanctions should be applied to anyone 
wiwilling to take the test oath. The Council was under constant pressure 
to move against this group as well. The Assembly, meeting with more reg-
ularity now, extended the time for taking the oath of allegiance, which 
took some of the· pressure off the Council, but this act had a proviso 
stating that professional men and businessmen ,-1ould not be pennitted to 
carry out tl1eir tasks unless they took the oath. 33 In part, this was a 
political device used against-the Conservatives, because in most instances 
these occupations were carried out by men who were not nternb·ers of the 
Radical group. 
III. Bryan 
Early in 1778, Thomas Wharton died, and the office of President of the 
Council remained vacant until the October elections when a full Col.mcil 
would be convened and a new President chosen. rt{ the interim, George Bryan 
carried out the duties which Wharton had been executing. The first evidence 
that the Assembly and the Council were not in complete hannony came in late 
1778, shortly after the elections. Bryan, ever the champion of freedom, 
33 Brunhouse, 49. 
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raised some questions ·about the morality of slavery. This was .one of the 
few subjects on which the Quakers and Bryan saw eye-to-eye. When the 
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends proposed the man-
umission of all slaves, they were applauded by Bryan. Many of the members 
of the Assembly owed their political existence to George Bryan, and he 
.reasoned that they would be agreeable to the suggestion that a law be· 
enacted to free the slaves within the confines of the Commonwealth. Bryan, 
however, was a legalist and thought that the approach should be one that 
was correctly presented, and one that would embrace his basic ideas. He 
felt that if the Assembly were to write the bill it would not accomplish ... 
what he desired. The result was that the CoW1cil made the suggestions to 
the Assembly on wliat the suggested bill should contain. The response to 
this suggestion was inmediate indignation, for the Assembly, jealous of its 
powers, replied that the Council did not have the authority to propose legis-
lation. Rebuffed, the Com1cil withdrew the suggestion but, as will be seen, 
pursued their goal in other ways. Bryan felt concern for the slaves as 
human beings, but his greater regard for them was as they served as indica-
tions of the w~akness of the Constituti6n. Here again, Bryan's legalism 
was the motivating force. He assumed that slavery per ~ violated the "free 
and equal" clause of the Constitution. There did not seem to be a sharp 
political division on the question, and it has been suggested that the reply 
from the Assanbly was an attempt to embarrass Bryan by the Conservatives in. 
the body. 34 
34 Konkle, 145; Bnmhouse, 81. 
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This did not dismay Bryan or deter him in his purpose. Again in 
1779, he urged the Council to offer the emancipation proposal to the 
Assembly. This time the Council was even more specific than it had been 
earlier. They suggested gradual abolition to apply only to infants and: 
children born of slaves. They recognized that adult slaves were "'sc:arce:ly 
competent" to secure their freedom and compete in ·a world.where ·their 
experience was very limited. They urged tl1e Assembly to abolish further 
importation, and disregarding legalisms this time, argued·that the 
Assembly would be rendering a service to humanity. 
Accepting the advice of the Cotmcil, the Assembly this time approved 
a measure that included all the points suggested by the Council. Perhaps 
' there is some merit in the suggestion that the earlier rebuff was .an 
atteinpt to embarrass Bryan, for now the Assemb~y had an overwhelming 
Radical majority. Even so, the final vote for p:assage ,vas. ·only 34 to 21. 
It is sigi1ificant tl1at many of the dissenting yot·es crune. frQlll ·thos.e 
/ 
counties that were predo1ninately Radical--rarely did. they- :send an Anti-
Constitutionalist -to represent them. Thus, some o.f :those voting against 
the measure came from those areas of greatest Rad·ical support--the rural 
areas of the south and west. There .were some other dissenting voices 
heard,.principally from those who felt that tne legislation did not go 
far enough. They favored complete emancipation. The southwestern portion 
of tl1e State, which was to provide future challenges to the Govemnent, 
was the largest slave-holding area at this time and for some time td come. 
There was a tendency to ignore a law if the person did not agree with it, 
:, 
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y and in some instances this is precisely what happened. Many in the area 
were from Virginia and did not feel any compassion for either black human 
beings or for the Constitution which granted them many of the freedoms 
they desired. In a will probated in Washington Cowity on May 16, 1781, 
the deceased Jacob Jolmston bequeathed a "negro girl and her future 
increase • • • " Records indicate that as late as 1790, there were 263 
slaves in the county, a few more than the kno\m slave population in this 
same county in 1780. 35 
\ One cannot help but be appalled at the number of petty details that 
(came to the attention of the CoW1cil. This body, assigned to the difficult 
·task of carrying out the will of the Legislature in prosecuting the war, 
and of treading the thin line between two militant political factions, 
\vas continually flooded with appeals for help. The minutes of the Council 
are replete with pleas to re~Jt fines for persons found guilty by both the 
magisterial courts and the courts of oyer and tenniner for crimes ranging 
from petty thievery to murder, adultery and bastardy. Requests for remis-
sion of corporal plUlishment were not infrequent, but the Council, feeling 
that some punitive action had to be taken as an object lesson to discourage 
future crimes, rarely canceled this portion of the punishment. Fines were 
often canceled for reasons of economy. If c\ guilty party ,\fas unable to 
pay, as wa~ frequently the case, incarceration was imposed tmtil the fine 
/ was paid. Lacking the means to discharge this obligation, the criminal 
35 Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Series, VII, 77-81; Journals of Asseinbly, March 1, -1780; Alfred Creigh, Ilistory of \\Tashi~&ton County, (Harris-burg, 1870) 362; Boyd Crumrine, History of t•Jash1ngton C9unty, (PJ-tll-adelphia, 1882) 261 • 
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\ 
would become a Government charge, which tinder already trying ciretnnstances, 
made the economic burden of the State even greater. In keeping ,vi th the 
Council philosophy about pl1ysical punishment, tl1e Sheriff of Philadelphia 
County was ordered to restore to its original location in the public 
market the pillory and whipping post which had been ·removed to a less con-
spicuous place. 36 
Poli tics loomed large in th~. wor,k' .. o:f · the Council. This was especi~lly 
true in the early years of independence ,vhen many felt their loyalty to 
the new Constitution should be rewarded. People of both high and lo\\1 
es·tate sought favors, appointments and even passes ·to enemy held territory. 
Daniel Roberdeau, who could never be accused of Tory sympathies, sought a ~ ~ 
reversal of a ruling prohibiting a Mrs. Ferguson from leaving the Cormnon-
weal th. He wrote that in his view the lady was loyal to the Constitution 
and he would be ''agreeable'' to a reconsiderati_qn by the .·council. Individ-
uals often sought services for themselve·s or t·he±1 .. · friends-. ·On on.e occasion, 
a Bedford County official sen·t- his. resi,gnation to the Council ,vith a recom-
mendation for his successor. The: Council responded that a resignation 
"must be done clearly, fully and simply, without condition or reservation." 
Although they could find no fault with the proposed successor, to follow 
this-procedure would serve as a precedent that might be difficult to over-
come in the future. The Council, in this cautious way, was attempting_ t-o 
forestall future reconunendations that would in any way compromise then, I 
without foregoing the acceptance of any future suggestions that could be 
decided on merit as well as politics. Later, during and after the tenn of 
36 Colonial Records, XI, XII, XIII, passim; George Bryan to High Sheriff, 
~larch 17, 1779, PeIU1Sylvania Archives, 1st Series, VII, 252. 
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Joseph Reed as President, the Cotmcil was bothered less by ·office-
seekers. 37 
The problem of appointments was frequently fexing. In one instance, 
-~ 
the Council appointed one person to several positions, only to have Jonathan t 
Dickinson Sergeant write to them deploring this procedure because the office-
holder was spread too thin. All offices would_ be improperly handled and 
-nothing would be achieved. The Gover1unent occasionally made mistakes in 
appointments, and in one instance found to their dismay that they liad 
appointed not only an Anti-Constitutionalist, but a Tory as well, and 
placed him in charge of expediting the emission of funds from the Loan 
Office. 38 
Jobs of a non--political nature were also sought through the Cotmcil • 
. In some instances, a cloak of authority and legality was sought in order. 
that payment for services could be made, as in the case of a Lancaster man 
seeking pennission to grind bayonets. 39 
According to the Constitution, a prime responsibility of the CoW1cil · 
was to advise the Assembly of the inadequacies of the laws. The Council 
could not propose laws when they saw a need, but was charged with the achn.irt-
istration of the laws--to point out that because of an oversight the 
Assembly I1ad not passed a law that could be executed and administered 
-37 
· Daniel Robe~deau to George Bryan, November 28, 1778; Timothy Matlack to Robert Galbraith, November 27, 1778; Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Series, 
VI I, 100, .. 99. ) 
38 Sergeant to Wharton, May 13, 1778; Dennis O'Neal to Wharton, May 14, 1778,. ibid." 1st Series, VI, 499, 498. . 
39 Ebenezer Crowell to George Bryan, April 8, 1778, Bryan Papers • 
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properly. At the begim1ing of each new session of the Assembly, the 
President of the Council usually sent .a message outlining the need for 
in1provement in some of the legislation passed at prior sessions. Unfor-
tunately, this message in its original design, ,v1as only advisory, and 
\vas a kind of State of the Corrnnon\veal th paper. The minutes of the Council 
refer to these as messages from the President, and there is nothing to 
show that the Council as a body agreed or disagreed with the contents. lt· 
is probable that the message was the r.e.sult of a general discussion and· 
was the sense of the body as a whole. Reading these message gives 9ne a. 
clue to the relative strength of each President, and if my conjecture is 
accurate, the strength of the Council as a 1vhole. T11ey began with lfuarton 
who adhered strictly to tl1e rules as laid do\m by the Constitution. During 
Reed's tenn they reflect a grea.t -deal of independence, are only slightly 
less forceful during the Presidency of \\Tilliam !v1oore and John Dickinson, 
then go into gradual decline during the final years of the period. During 
~\lharton' s tenure-, the State was primarily concerned with the consolidation 
of Radical political strength, providing men and supplies to ti1e Continental_ .. 
forces, maintaining and rei11forcing the Gover1nnent and collecting taxes. 
Indeed, these aims for the most part were the occupation of the Goverrnnent 
until the treaty of peace was signed. In the beginning, Vvharton was prob-
f 
ably as close as possible to being the ideal man for the Presidency. He 
viewed the Constitution as neither good nor bad, but necessary. He sa"¥1 
the Constitution as strengthening the hands of those desiring power, but 
·, . 
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·who under the old provincial system could not grasp it. As a moderate, 
he felt that his influence could be effective in guiding the Constitu-
tionalists into a responsible group, hoping to avoid the charge of irre-
sponsibility. 40 Tii.e innumerable crises that occurred in the first few 
years did not pennit the Council to provide the guidance necessary. These 
crises, coupled ,~ith the death of 1\Tharton in r-.-ray, 1778, and the interim 
leadersl1ip of Bryan, seemed to force the Council into a kind of holding 
action. The addresses to the Assembly reflected this. They l\Tere con-
cerned primarily with militia la,~s and with supplies and men for the 
anned forces. They lacked vigor· and imagination. But a new Government, 
unaccustomed to governing, may not be required ~o incorporate these features 
when tl1e day to day problems seem .ovenvhelming. 
Throughout the period of the first Constitution, the strength of the 
Governme11t lay in tl1e strength of tl1e Supreme Executive Council and its: 
/· administration. The make-up of the legislature during the period 1776-
1790 was such that at no time, w~th the possible exception of the earliest 
' and the final days of the fundame11tal law, was th.ere. sufficient leadership 
and statesmansl1ip to provide the stability neces$ary for good government. 
A fickle electorate only infrequently provided one party or the other with 
.... ' more than a small majority. Because of the constant inter-party bicker-~fig ,· -
tl1e Assembly was usually assaulting or defending actions taken at previous 
sessions, or attempting to pass·· legislation that the minority party consid:-, 
40 Wharton, ''Thomas 'Whart<?n, Jr.", PivINB, V, 433-435. 
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ered anathema. As a result, any stability which prevailed during most of 
the period came not from tl1e annually elected Assembly, but from the 
triermially elected Counc~~ •. 
If the Council accepted literally the Constitution-mandated powers, 
it would have been little more than a body of sub-alterns in a society 
beset with problems. On the other hand, if the Council was to shape its 
,) actions by the needs of society and the State, they would be able to 
provide a more sensible approach to tl1ese problems confronting gover1nnent 
than would the Assembly~ hbether the latter course was followed or not 
depende<l to a large extent 011 who was serving as President at any given 
time, and how seriously these problems were approachecl. \vharton was 
h.andicapped because he was first to hold the reigns of government and 
because of the antagonisms that had been generated by the adoption of the: 
Constitution. To follow a course other than the one ,outlined by the 
Constitution might have aggravated the situation and left no room to· 
ma11uever. TI1ere was no precedent for any of Cotmcil 's action, and any 
personal strengths \Vharton may have had would have been dissipated without 
a strict interpretation. The l)osition of Bryan ,,,las well known •. His un-
wavering belief in a W1icameral legislature became a limiting factor during 
the short span he served as chief executive of the State. A strong Council 
and a strong President was precluded by this philosophy. Bryan's tenure, 
however, was sl1ort, and the office went to a man who had earlier vacillated 
and had in t11e interim acquired not a few political enemies. Joseph R.eed' s 
actions .were such, his enemies notwithstanding, that he connnanded the 
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( 
respect of not only the contemporary generation but others that followed. 
The time in which he lived had such a profound effect on him that he in r 
.. turn had profound effect upon the government.of Pennsylvania. Under him 
ti1e stature of the Council was enhanced, and the office of the President 
became something more than that of a chief messenger for the Assenbly. 
For all practical purposes, Reed was the Council during the years 1779 
through 1781. 
IV.. The Council Under tte~d. 
Prior to his election.to the Council, Reed had held a number of 
important posts in various areas of government. lle had ·served as Geot..g·e 
1Vashington' s adjutant general with distinction and had the c0)11p·1e.te con.~ 
fidence of the Corrunander-in-Chief. He had been a member of the ·continenta). 
Congress from. Pe1111sylvania, and had been offered the position of Chief 
Justice of the Conmonweal th in 1777. His vacillation in responding to thi~ 
invitation aroused much criticism ,vhen he finally .decided. to decline thJ 
offer. The famous Reed-Cadwalader controversy· grew o~t of this and the 
subject was still a matter of debate almost a century later. 41 
The electorate honored Reed ·by electing him to the Assembly and the 
··Counc.il at tl1e same time. lie chose the Council because he felt that in 
:doi:ng .so he. would be. making a greater sacrifice than he might if he took: a ..
·41 ·. · . .. · 
.. J.ohn. F .•. Roche, Joseph Reed (New York, 1957) 114-131. 
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seat in the Assembly. l\Ti thout attempting to diminish the stature of the 
man, it should be pointed out that had.he chosen the Assembly instead of 
the CoW1cil, he would have had to stand for reelection in a year, whereas 
a seat on the Council would preclude his having to run for office for 
three years. He felt strongly about the revolutionary cause, and could 
not fully understand the reluctance of some not to make sacrifices will-
ingly. He acknowledged that his acceptance of the electoral mandate was 
evidence of his willingness to make such a sacrifice, even tl1ough there 
were .other areas in which his talents could be used. 42 It was no secret 
that \Vashington desired to have l1im return to his post on his staff •. 
The early years of the Government of the Cormno~th had made it 
:clear that le$i~1ating and administering that legislation ·in a State where 
political cleavages \vere great would be difficult at best. This, coupled 
witl1 the internal problems facing the Gover1nnent--the inl1erent suspicion -
by the western section of the eastern counties, the settlement of \vestem -~-
Pennsylva11ia by Virg.inians loyal to their home state, the settlement of 
the l\Tyon1ing Valley· by Connecticut frontiersmen and tl1e continuing militia 
ptoblem--might have caused a lesser man to forego·· the sacrifices. Reed, 
... 
however,. looked upon his subsequent election to the· Presidency as an oppor-
tunity to reduce. the ever-present party strife. tie ... had an advantage over 
-
,· 
his predecessors in the l1andling of the frontier problems due to ·his mili~ 
tary backgrotmd, althougl1 there is little evidence that. these problems· wer~ 
42 Reed to Nathaniel Greene, November S, 1778 in W. B. Reed, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed (2 V. Philadelphia, 1847) II, 39. 
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solved or even minimized during his tenn of office. · He had throughout 
the whole of this period the confidence of Washington which pennitted 
, him to carry on extensive correspondence requesting Anny regulars to .. 
support the local militia in attempting to control Indian frontier 
incursions, and to a lesser extent, freeing the militia to act against 
the Wyoming settlers while the regulars attempted to control the frontJer 
and the Indian raids. . \fuen he and lA./ashington had made the riecessary 
arrangements, he would then present his plans to the Council, whose 
duty it was to actually issue instructions to the militia. The Council, 
finding itself in a position of doing little more than approving a fait 
accompli, would generally issue :the necessary instructions. 43 
Reed had no illusions that·. he was in complete control of the State 
Government, nor ,.;as there any indication that this was his aim. I-Ie was 
desirous of completing the revolution in Pennsylvania, and l1e outlined 
l1is interpretation of the Council's responsibi_li ties. It ,vas the. As$:~bly .. '::s 
responsibility to "provide the means of supporting a just and nec·ess.~ry 
war'', and "relieving public di~tress". The Council's duties were ,.,to 
execute the laws and apply t}:lose means to public purposes." 44 As ,vill 
be seen, Reed's interpretation meant two different things--one to the 
Assembly and another to him. 
Even witl1 this supposed understanding, the messages sent to the 
Assembly, when they reconvened, ,v-ere more than a report on hol\T the Com1ci·1 
43 Reed to Jared Ingersoll• December 15, 1778; Reed to 1Afashington, April 24, 1779 and April 25, 1779; 1Vashington to Reed, April 27, 1779; Reed to Washington, rvlay 1, 1779; \Vashington to Reed, i\1ay 8, 1779; Reed to \\Tashington, flay 8, 1779 in Reed, Life and Corresrondence II, 39, 89-91,· 91-93, 93-96, 96-99, 99, 100-106. 
44 Ibid., II, 297. 
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executed the laws of previous sessions of the Assanbly. The correspondence 
sent to the Assembly by the two prior Presidents and the Councils they 
r~presented indicate~ areas of weakness in the gove11nnent. None, however, 
went so far as Reed's first message. It was apparent that Reed was cog-
nizant of many of the problems when he assumed office, for his address to 
the Asseinbly made positive suggestions on the legislative course of action. 
That the Assembl)' was not alanned by the boldness of the suggestions can 
be traced to nvo factors. Reed was a man whose integrity as a zealous 
member of the l\Jl1ig establisrnnent ivas understood and respected. The Rad-
icals never doubted that he \\lOuld not attempt any action that \vould under-
mine their revolution and upset the Constitution as it was written. Also, 
the Legislature elected in the Fall of 1778 was so, overwhelmingly Radical--
• 
one of the few times the Radicals commanded mor~ than :a. bare majority--that 
it is doubtful that anything could have i11fiuenced it un1e$S it was recep-
tive to such action. Reed saw··m.ore than anyone then or later that leader-
ship l1ad to be provided, a11d b.ecause of the respect he c·onnnanded he could 
,enlist the support of many if the ideas proposed ··were sound an.cl progressive.-•. 
··' 
Ilis first message shows an awareness of the magnitude of the problems 
facing the Assembly and the populace, and while he did not draft specific 
bills, he outlined the ·needs of the State with 'subtle suggestions ·for fulfil-
ling tl1em. llis approach was not unlike some field. comnanders ,vho feel that 
the best defense is a good offense. I-le saw nothing to be gained in a holding 
action. I-le deplored. the fact that the Assembly authorized expenditures with-
out regard to the condition of the Treasury, or the income of the State. 
'.•I. ' ,• 
• 
, ... 
' 
.... ·3·.i7:. . ;,, 
This problem might be alleviated somewhat if the Assembly had a budget. Such a budget need not be, indeed could not be, a specifically itemized document, but it would place income and expenditures in perspective. He 
noted that "forestallers of flour and other provisions'' were not being dealt with adequately, but that to be more effective in correcting this 
problem, an effort should be made to inculcate a more general feeling 
against the practice. New proposals for taxes were made. In most in-
stances the source of new money was assumed to be the wealthy--owners of pleasure carriages, owners of plate, owners of slaves and controllers o~ indentured servants. He encouraged more attention to the fees that 
nonnally would go to officeholders so that they would receive adequate 
compensation and also attract more people to the offices. Authorization 
was sought from the Assembly to pennit the Cotmcil to visit the \fyoming Valley in order to make it very clear to the settlers that this was 
Pennsylvania land, and that the authority of Pennsylvania laws extended 
to this area and should be honored. 45 
Two items of major importance, in Reed's view, were also presented . ~ to the Assembly for action. The problem of a single judiciary with no 
appeal from its verdicts seemed extremely ~arbitrary inasmuch as the j·udges 
~~ were also dependent upori human nature and could err. A court of appeal 
or review seemed a logical move, for such a court would review the cases . \ 
of those who took issue with a verdict, or who felt that they had not 
45 Colonial Records, February S, 1779, XI, 685-688. 
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received a fair trial. Also, the matter of the estates of the Penn family had not been resolved and called for attention. for the officers of the 
Government were under constant pressure to remove this vestige of British 
authority. Reed pointed out that the rights and demands of society as a 
whole should be reconciled with prdlvate .justice and equity• an obvious . ' 
reference to pennitting an equitable settlement with the late proprietaries 
should the Assembly agree to foreclose on the estates. 46 
1here was one portion of the message that to the modern reader may 
appear unimportant, but to the conteniporaries of Reed was of a serious 
nature. Many of the Gover1unent leaders had a Presbyterian background 
which prompted them to frown on idleness and dissipation. Diversions which 
lowered th~ morality of the general populace should be dealt with severely. It had been suggested that horseracing and the theater should be legally 
suppressed, and duelling should not be cotmtenanced under any conditions. 47 The view of the Presbyterians in this period was no di£ ferent from the Quakers in an earlier period, and in this area the two religious bodies 
saw eye-to-eye. 
Though Reed was a leading' member of the Radical camp, his message 
met with something less than complete approbation. Many of the legis-
lators were new to the Assembly and were not amenable to the strong lead-
ership that Reed was trying to provide. They reacted sharply and replied 
that legislation originated in the Assembly. Reed, in his response to this 
46 Ibid., February S, 1779, XI, 689-690. 
47 Ibid., February S, 1779, XI, 688. 
·.;· 
. . ;,• . ,.· .. -., .. , .···., 
,; .··~······~---.... ---·-....... ·-·"···~ .. .", .. ·· ·,,. 
-39-
rebuke, denied that the Council was trying to impose bills on the I-louse. 
It seemed to Reed and the Council that the Constitution was clear on this 
... poi,nt, and stated that a message such as the one recently presented met 
the Constitutional requirement. Unde'r sµc.h an arrangE111ent, laws would 
be more accurate, and "the business of the State transacted more beneficial-
ly, harmoniously and expiditiously". The Assembly did not agree, however, 
that hannony would result from such a procedure. 48 
l\lhen one or the other of the two bodies sought tnfonnation or cooper-
ation from the other, the common practice was for the dissenting body to 
request a joi.nt con£ ere11ce with the otl1er. Such a conference was held to .. . ' .. . . . . . . 
. ,· 
work out the difficulties, and the Assembly f ina,lly ag .. reed that Reed'':s 
method of J1ot only advising the Assembly of inequities in the laws and 
suggesting solutions, but proposing ne,v legislation· v1here there was a: 
clear need, was the proper procedure. It was a clear victory for Reed ·and· 
the Council. This body, meeting daily, was in a. ~ore advantageous pos.itiop: 
to know how the laws worked, what the response of the ci tizemy was~ 
how best tt> reduce tl1e inequities. 49 
Fully aware that he liad the upper hand, P .. eed now pressed his advantage 
like a military conunander .who has an enemy at bay. He sensed that the 
Assembly was dragging its feet, and .a follow-up letter went £ran the 
Council to the Assembly asking what had been done about the Cotmcil's 
proposal on February 5. Reed placed. the burden of proof on the As~emblyi, 
48 Ibid., February 16, 1779 XI, 701. 
49 Ibid., February 16, 1779 XI, 701. 
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·and it made no effort to resist his strong leadership.. It shortly asked 
the Council to prepare an estimate of expenses for the next six months, a 
step forward in the preparation of a budget. No,v completely cowed by Reed, 
the Assembly also fonvarded a resolution whith expressed complete confidence y 
in the Council and in the way they were administering the laws. SO 
It must have given Reed a sense .of satisfaction even though it was 
·not his desire to act individually or with the Council alone. He was 
, completely dependent on the Assembly to do \vhat was necessary by legislating 
laws that could be administered. 
The 1\ssembly in its det-~rmination to act upon the suggestion of the 
Council occasio11ally wrot~, laws intending one thing, but worded in contra-
diction to its i11tent. Reed had suggested. a revision in the la,vs relating 
to marriage license fees. The law, when read by the Council after passage 
by the Assembly, did not seem to ·produ~e. the· desired result. Its published 
purpose \vas to increase the ·fees, but. .it. lvas so ambiguously \\rorded that the 
Council returned it to the Ass.embly ·,,1J1en they could not decide if, in fact, 
tl1e fees, I1ad been i11creased. 51 . . . . . . .. . . . . . ' ··-
During_' Reed's Presidency, tl1e pt,o.61ems of the Confedert1tion, and 
especially· the Anny, received greater. attention than during t11e 1\lliarton-Bryan 
period. Because of Reed's clbse as~o,ci.ation with 1Vasl1ington, the General 
felt freer about niaking suggestions to PeIU1Sylvania than he did to other 
States where. the chief executive \vas Ie:s·s known to him:. In October, 1779, 
50 Ibid., ~larcl1 1, 1779; ~larch 9, 1779; April 6, 1779 XI, 711-713, 716, 739. 
51 Ibid., April 28, 1779 XI, 760. 
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.. 
Washington asked Reed to secure additional troops, but Reeq was not·able 
to act without prior approval from the Assembly. The response from the 
latter body laid the burden on the Council. 52 This was another. example 
of the relucta.i1ce of the Assembly to act in military matters, a condition 
.. 't.hat prevaile<l throughout tl1e war. The ~-sembly recognized the need for· 
men, for money, and supplies, and they frequently acted on. the latter 
two, but matters dealing lV"ith the regular anny or the mi.litia were skirted, 
and the responsibility was shifted to the Council. This may have steimned 
from the fact that the Constitution pointedly made the President of the 
Council the supreme c011n11anq~-r ·o·f troops, and the Assembly seeme.d ·reluctant 
to encroach on an area where they asstm1ed tl1e.y :ivere constitutionally for-
bidden to enter. 
Earlier, we find the liouse urging the Council to q.o. e.vecytl-1:ing i,n its 
power to secure additional men, and in order to provide sane incentive for 
.:J _, 
militia duty, volunteers ,vere to. be ~xem.pted from taxes for one year. 53 . . ~ ' 
·rhe Jifficulty in raising taxes was- ;_c;ontinually recognized by the Assembly, 
and ·it suggested to the CoW1cil tl1at, inasmuch as the troops from Perinsyl-
vania were being used to the advantage of the United States, it would be: 
prudent to l1ave the militia become a part of the· Continental Army. In 'this-
way they hoped to escape some of the military expenditures cormected wj.tlJ. 
t?he militia. Cotmcil was to transmit this proposal to the PeIU1sylvani.a 
. 
. delegates in Congress to work out, but nothing cam~ of ;it for a variety o.f 
52 Margaret Burnham J\.facMillan, The War Governors in the .American Revolution (New York:. 1943) 89. 
53 Colonial Records, Jtme 6, 1777 XI, 215. 
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f 
reasons. The Assembly did not recognize that the efficiency of the 
militia declined in direct proportion to the distance travelled from 
their home base, thus increasing the cost, nor did it realize that trans-
ferring this body of troops would in no way effect a reduction in military 
expenditures. Addition of the militia to the regular forces would simply 
increase Pennsylvania's cost of maintaining the Continental Anny. The 
Assembly desired to accomplish a reduction in costs, and still have the 
militia remain on Pennsylvania soil. Most citizens recognized that 
militia duty was a lawful responsibility, no matter, how distasteful. That 
there was a greater reluctance to serve in the Continental Anny was shown 
by the Assembly action providing for a bounty to those who enlisted in 
the regular Anny in order that it be brought up to full strength, an action 
that had been urged by the Council, because they were confident that with-
out it, any program for enlistment would fail. 54 
The continuing relationship between Washington and Reed prompted 
Washington to suggest that the Assembly "invest the executive with plen-
ipotentiary powers''. 55 .· The Confederation, and particularly the Army, was 
in difficult straits, and each state was urged to use every power to assist 
the revolutionary cause. Reed's reply indicated that \~ashington did not 
have the respect of the Assembly that was later accorded him, and Reed felt 
he had to be very guarded in.how he presented this request to that body. 
It seen5 apparent that had the Assembly the slightest inklingthat \4/ashington 
S4 Ibid., January 14, 1778, XI, 428. 
55 c. Fitzpatrick, ed. The Writings of Washin&i:on, XVIII, 434-440 in MacMillan, 90. 
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' wa:s behind, this move, the request would not have been granted. In Jtme,. 
1780, Reed was granted the ''power of doing what may be necessary, -without 
attendi11g to the ordinary fonns of law." 56 
Prices continued to occupy a great deal of the attention of both the 
Council and the ~i\ssernbly. They also continued to create consternation 
among many private citizens. Most of the difficulty lay no~ in shortages, 
but ratl1er in the fact that there were so many speculators making large 
purchases and then offering these products for sale at greatly inflated 
prices. TI1is problem was allied to another of equal seriousness--the lack 
of sound money. Specie was in very short supply and the creation of bills 
of credit and paper money only made legal tender increase and prolonged 
the problem. The Council frequently reconmended. corrective legislation, 
and the Assembly, unable to solve the problem bec.ause they lacked the 
fiscal experience necessary, created an impasse by just as frequently 
suggestir1g tliat the· Cow1cil take what steps it could to control the situation. 
The Council was regularly receiving correspondence with advice and complaints. 
As is often the case, those who suffered most as a result of tl1e lack of 
sound money and l1igl1 prices were those least able to do anything about it.· 
One Bucks County fanner complained to Reed that winter forage was available, 
but the asking price was ·a-lready higl1er than that authorized by the Assembly, 
and speculators \-vere driving the price still higher. _57 
Stabilization of _the currency was a topic considered by more persons 
56 Reed to 1\Tashi11gton, June S, 1780 in Reed II, 209-213; Colonial Records, June 3, 1780 XII, 374. 
57 William r.1cCalle to Reed., August 4, 1779, Pennsylvania Archives, VII, 620. 
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than just those in the Government. Some of these men, particularly 
Philadelphians who were believers in the kind of democracy epitomized 
in the Constitution, saw that the kind of government they wanted would 
only prevai~ if they showed evidence of good faith and made some real 
sacrifices that would be recognized by all classes of people. At a 
Philadelphia town meeting July 7, 1779, a plan was advanced to stabilize 
the currency. By such stabilization, further issues of paper money would 
be tmnecessary and a more orderly ooney policy would be established. It 
was admitted that the plan was experimental, but there was an underlying 
•.) 
hope for success. It was thought that if in Philadelphia County it had 
any degree of success, then other counties might initiate the same type 
of program and thus provide a state-wide solution. The plan was a mod~l 
·of simplicity. A house to house canvass would be made seeking pledges 
from each person. Once the pledges were secured, the Assembly would be 
asked to pa~s a law which would exempt each subscriber from taxes until 
his future truces equalled his subscription or for three years. Once the 
law was passed, collections would then be made, and the collectors would 
be pennitted to draw off their expenses only, without the percentage 
allowed regularly appointed tax collectors. This plan was threefold in ~ I I 
~ 0 scope--prepayment of taxes, withdrawing money from circulation, and, as 
~ 
a result, driving prices down. 58 Perhaps the simplicity of the plan was 
what foredoomed it. There was already a scarcity of money, and when the 
58 Pennsylvania Archives, VII, 621-622. 
\· 
L 
' I'• 1 .. 
( . 
~i' 
,',I 
,•, ' 1 I 
h ; 
i 
I 
! I • 
! 
I " I 
I I " 
i 
: 
' ! 
-45-
( 
truces were·prepaid, it would. be difficult if not impossible to keep 'the 
State solvent until taxes would again be due later in the t~ree year 
period. The planners forgot tl1at the State had to pay its bills and 
would probably use all income immediately to maintain its credit. 
i-Iowever much merit the plan had .from _the planner's purview, it did 
I' l1ave one flaw of wl1iGh Ree.d was not aware until he raised sane questions. 
Reed complained to the Assembly that they rarely gave sufficient consider-
ation to public credit, even thoug-11-: ·the sales of confiscated estates of 
suspected Tories did contribute some relief to an overburdened Treasury. 
I-le referred briefly to the stabilization plan, and advised the Assembly 
that such a plan woul.d b.e submitted for their consideration. The answers· 
to tl1e questions ra.is~d by Reed stunned .him. :He learned that the money· 
collected would be eannarked to fill Cong·res.s.'· requisitions, and. c:ould 
.., 
not be used to relieve the local, county: or. state burdens. -Needless .to ... 
say, the plan was never submitted to the Assembly. 59 
Appeals to patriotism did not se·an to stir men as they were intended 
to do. Reed's greatest difftc.ulty was that .he was attempting to provide 
leadersl1ip to an assortment ·of individuals who· \-vere not tmited in a common 
,.,.. 
' i purpose. Some saw the Confederation as representing their true interest; 
others felt that the State should always receive first consideration; and 
there was a third group who were always promoting their own interests. The 
sad state of Pennsylvania currency was brought forcefulJ__y to Reed's attention 
59 Colonial Records, S~ptember 9, 1779 XII, 96-99; Rober<leau to Reed, September 17, 1779 Penns;r,lvania Archives VII, 643. 
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by a correspo11dent who advised that fanners near the 1v1aryland border were 
selling liheat to the i1aryland millers for twenty dollars a bushel, but 
were willi11g to sell it in Pennsylvania for sixteen dollars if a stable 
currency were available. The noney problem was not solved during Reed's 
admi11istration, nor was there anything more than 1nakesl1ift arrangements 
by tl1e 1\ssenbly LU1til after the cessation of hostilities. 60 
Reed was constantly seeking ways to improve the quality of government. Quality in goverrnnent was, however, an elusive thing '"'itl1 the Constitution-
alists and the opposing numbers were frequently' at eac}1 otl1ers throats. 
To =Ree·d, at once a patriot i11 the finest sense and a democrat of t:he highest 
order, quality mea.nt treati11g adversaries in an even fas11ion vrith po.Iitical 
friends, even a.t tl1e ris·k of l1is reputation. Once, apparently overcome with 
self-pi t)r, l1e complained tl1at people went out of their \vay to test hi'TI, to 
disturb and destroy him, but still 11e had no choice but to do things l1e 
saw just in .order· that "others migl1t sleep", and to remain poor ,vhile othe-rs 
gre\\J rich. 61 His rapid and fearless action 1-vhen. the home of James 11ilson 
was attacked is a case in point. I-le had. little in conman 1iith \vilson polit-
ically, yet 11is dispersal of the 1nob arul the subsequent punishment of those 
taken into custody gave evidence of his belief in justice before the law 
as. a fundamental concept. Ilis furtl1er exposure to danger during the mutiny· 
of the Pennsylvania line again illustrated his ·belief in the Goverrnnent of 
Pennsylvania. His loyalty :was. to Pennsylvania rather than to the nation, 
-
60 Thomas Hale to Reed, September 9, 1779 Ibid., VII, 688. :.1aryland currency \vas no less unstable, and it seems obvious that the professed altruism of Hale was not a factor in the sale. ~1any men, then and since, have sold to the highest bidder, and Reed seems to be anong the very few who did not have a price. 
61 Reed to Greene, June 16, 1781 in Reed,· II, 359-360. 
' 
'( 
' 
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for there see1ns to be no evidence that the kind of gover1nnent that was 
proposed in 1787 would have had his approval. I-Ii? loyalties outside of 
the State were to individuals rather than corporate bodies. 
Reed's attentiv~ mind was constantly alert for inequities in the 
law. In his first report to the Assembly, he reviewed some of the. 
$uggestions of his predecessors on whicl1 the Assembly liad not acted, 
principally currency problems. \\Then the Assanbly authoriz·ed the 
issuance of another lot of currency, they could anticipate some counter~ 
feiting. · Earlier laws had n1ade counterfeiting a capital crime, and later 
ones a crime only punishable llll.der common la,v. Obviously, a counterfeiter 
would issue bogus money· copied from later e1nissions ·and risk receiving 
the lighter punishnent. Reed recommended that a new law be passed to 
cover counterfeiting by itself, rather than writing specific punishnents 
in each bill. This, l1owever, -ivas a minor problem compared with the ories 
that faced Reed and the Cow1cil on a day-to-day bas is. 
" 
Programs ,-vere continually being devised that would provide a. m9.re 
equitable distributio11 of commodities to those .in distress and unabl.e to 
pay the exhorbitant c~rges. One program proposed a means of increasing 
the supply of produce and thus driving prices down. To do this, it \vas 
suggested tJiat bounties be given to those ,vho were able to ~h~p more 
supplies to market. It was ~xpected that such a move would have three 
beneficial results. ·First, more produce would relieve the market problem 
and provide a larger food supply for the ·non-fann population. The plan 
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would also provide greater income for fanners because o"f larger shipments, 
and reduce the desire to withhold produce lllltil prices increased to compen-
,; 
sate for the depreciation of paper rooney and the additional bounty income. 
There were wealalesses in the plan which were~ecognized by the Council, 
which passed them over in its desire to present some kind of program. The 
continuing depreciation of paper JlX)ney would quickly absorb any penalties 
against speculation, and there was no guarantee that with an increase in 
the amount of material available more speculators ivould not avail thenselves 
of t;hese 11e\v opportunities. If this ha1Jpened, the urban population ,vould 
have no_ relief from tl1e higl1 prices they were already paying. Though the 
Assembly seemed aware of these dra,\Tbacks, their desire to correct the· 
problem made them believe the good t}¥J.t 1AJould come from such a program 
would outiveigh negative aspects. It 1vas a problem tha.t call.ed for :a t.ompt.e-
hensive solution., but was being approached in a piecemeal .fashion. The: 
fooJstuf fs proble1n was a particularly ve:x±ng one, because th.e r·:eqt.tisitions 
from Cor1gress called for gifts-in-kind. ratl1er than money. 62 
'.;. 
Early in 1780, CoU11cil suggested a ne,v approach to the ,1hole matter. 
The Assembly was reluctant to rescind. the legal tender laws because tl1is 
\vOuld make paper· money wortl1less.,. and arouse the weste.rn colUlties ,vri'ich 
favored soft money. TI1~ Council fe1 t it had to do something to control the 
paper inoney and to attract s_pecie, and at the same time relieve the grain: 
shortage which threatened the ,v-l1ole war effort. Even i11 making these 
62 Reed to Assen.b+y, November 13, 1779, December 9, 1779 Colonial Records, XII, 167-169, 225; Brunhouse, 85 • 
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suggestions to the Assembly, the Council made it kno\\TI'l that they ivere . 
clutcl1i11g at stra,vs and that they really did not feel the· solution was 
at l1and. In this i1istance, they passed on a suggestion that taxes be 
paid ·i11 grain and the grain sold for specie. Some of tl1is grain coul_d· 
be turned over to tl1e Confe<leration as part of Pennsylvania's contri--
bution, and tl1e balance be sold. Reed pointed out to tl1e Ass~b.ly that 
tl1e persons ,1110 would be able to pay i11 specie would not be the persons 
1nost i11 need of the grain, but the speculators who ivould either attempt 
to sell it at l1igl1er prices o_r- export it abroad on a false manifest. No 
·011e ir1 the Government 1iant·ed to e·ncourage the speculators, ,vhicl1 such a 
move \vould certainly do. 63 
A11otl1er set of suggestions came from \1illiam IIenry, who hc1.d bet~n 
one of those who had advocated .the earlier Philadelphia IJlan. :for collecting 
specie. Ile felt that, since a. year was. allo\ved for payrn~n.t o-f tavern 
lic.e1ise fees, they should .be paid in ·hard money. f!e also .felt that d·is.-
tillers of grain sl1ould be licensed as they had been during ·the: propti:_e·tor~· 
' ' 1--· 
ship. Not only should tl1is practice be reswned, but the fees s·hould be 
increased fifty percent above the . earli:er· fee. By his calculations, an 
.. additional l9000 would be added to the Treasury, and the meas:ure would 
aid in ·tontrolling "dram shops" and have a moral influence on· ·the conunun-
i ty. If the fanners <lid ne>t apply for a distiller's license,, and i'f the 
/penalty for distilling without a license \vere severe, then the· amorn1t of 
63 R1:1ed to Assembly, January 25, 1780 Colonial Records, XII, 233. 
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-- . grai11 flo1vi11g to marl(et would increase. l1ith additional supplies, tl1e 
prices would be drive11 down. The 11npractical suggestion that fines and 
forfeitures be paid. in specie ,·Jas made. TI1e Council \vqs repeatedly 
requested to forgive fines because of the .inability to pay, and to re-
quire fines to be paid in l1ard money would only increase these requests. 
Henry then made an extremely complicated reconm1enclation. The Stat~ 
s11ould receive taxes in paper money, but to 1)revent the further depreciation 
of paper, taxes could also be paid in :ivhea:t ivhich would be accept"ed as 
specie. The value of the ,vheat ·would ·be computed by using a fonnula 
(whicl1 he onl)' suggested) that inc11Xled t11e so-called: market value, tl1e 
disttihce from tl1e. n1arket, the cost of t·rans.pottation, and the current 
:depreciated value of paper mon·ey-,as. o:~t.ennined. by t11e Cotmcil_. Perhaps 
tl1e niathen1atics were -t.oo- difficult for· t.he CoUI1cil, for they passed t11is 
on to tl1e Asseinbly ·w.ith.oµt connnent, wh:ere. no one acte<l to i11plement ::such 
.a: pro:gr:an1 •. 6.4. 
lVitl1 tl1e Assen1b1y· :o··f 1779-80 also. unde.r Radic.~l ·contro.·1:, ·Re~cl and tl1e, 
:council fotu1d tl1emselv.es in a positi.011 ·,vhere. it· ,1as necess.ary to· lecture 
the .Asseinbly on the re:5ports.ibilit·ies o,f the two bod.i.e.s., A }re?tf earlier, 
'" 
the. Asse1nbly had rebuked the Council; nolv: .it ,vas the Council's turn. In 
three instances, individuals appealed. to the Assembly to reverse decisions 
_made by the Council. In all three cases, the Assembly found for the appel-
lant, and then had to recall their judge~ents due to Council complaints. 
64 1-Ienry to Reed, ~-lay 26, 1781 in Francis.Jordan, Jr., The Life of lNilliam I-Ier1ry (Lanca·ster, 1910) 148-150. 
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Reed did not mince words in his statement, 
We should be wanting in duty to our station ••• if we did not express our conceni at the interference of ••• the House in matters merely of an executive nature, and which have been already under the cognizance of the Board0 and received a full determination. 
.. 
Reed added that the law from which the person was appealing was st.ill 
in force• nor can any act of ours, or even a vote of the House, legally dispence ,vith or annul it. 
Reed pointed out that the single chamber type of gover1nnent could 
prove an embarrassment if such procedures were pennitted. 
We cannot supp<,\se that the Legislative wish to acquire popularity at t4e expense of the Executive authority, much less that they would furnish Enemies of the Govern-ment with a p:roof of t.he dangers arising from a single branch of the Legislature v which has been so often and frequently assertedo But it is most evident that both these consequences floi\ling from this kind of inter-position will follOW0oe6S 
It was a lesson in constitutional law, and pointed out one\of the weak-
nesses of the unicameral system of govermnent. The appeals could not be 
taken to court, for there was no provision for this. Also the action of 
the Council was the result of an appeal which did not meet the needs of the 
appellant, thus his request for a further hearing from the Assanbly. , 
As Reed neared the end of his tenn on the Collllcil, the usual problem 
of public credit continued to be the most hagging; however, others had 
become more critical in recent months. The boundary dispute with Virginia 
over the southwest section of the State, as well as frequent outbursts of 
65 Reed to Assembly, May 27, 1780, Colonial Records, XII, 366. 
.. 
~· 
.... --··- : . 
-52-
the Com1ecticut settlers in the Wyoming Valley increased. In both 
instances, the Assembly was more active during the early periods of 
-·dispute, but the Cowicil had become deeply involved as time progressed. 
The problems of the frontier had always been a source of ~rouble for the 
Council. Early in the war, the Assembly decided that the botm.dary 
b~tween PeIU1Sylvania and Virginia should be definitely drawn, and the 
Cotmcil was ordered to transmit this infonnation to the PeIU1Sylvania 
delegates in the Congress so they, in turn, could advise the Virginia 
delegates. 66 For all their good intentions, little was done beyond a 
steady flow of correspondence between the two states, tmtil 1781 when 
Pennsylvania advised Virginia that the boundary dispute--it had become 
a dispute by this time--should be settled on "astronomical principles" 
because this would be the ''most accurate and satisfactory." 67 
The dispute between these two1 Government was more than a difference 
between two sovereign states. The settlers, many of wll.om had moved into 
the area from Virginia, were deeply divided and the question, when finally 
settled, had to have the people's acceptance. Some Pennsylvanians had 
moved into the area and this tended to compound the problem. The acceptance 
... 
of the people was based less on where the boWldary would ultimately be 
located than on the method by which they would be governed and the degree 
to which they would govern themselves. 68 
, From October, 1781 to March, 1782, little was done on the boundary 
66 Ibid., July 6, 1777, XI, 240. 
.. 
, .... 
. ,;~ 67 Ibid., October 18, 1781, XIII, 79 • 
• 
68 Russell J. Ferguson, Early Western Penn!llvania Politics (Pittsburgh, 1938), 32-33. 
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reconciliation, principally because of the winter weather. In March, the 
{, Assembly had some second thoughts about the method to be used and questioned 
whether there \vas not a less expensive method of detennining the botn1dary. 
Finally, in Februal)', 1783, the joint connnission appointed by both states 
submitted their proposal for approval. The Assembly gave its approval to 
what became the pennanent boundary, and in a proclamation the inhabit$ts 
of Washington and Westmoreland Counties were advised of the settlement, 
and were urged to cooperate with the laws of Pennsylvania. 69 
In the interim between the first resolution of 1777 and the final 
settlement of 1783, there was more activity in the area than appeared in 
tl1e boundary dispute. Settlers had moved from Virginia into the area claimed 
by PeIU1sylvania, but did not immediately give up their allegiance to Virginia. 
It was learned tl1at Virginia planned to sell land in the area set up as 
\\festmoreland County, an action the Assembly was powerless to stop because 
of the lack of military resources to combat the British troops and hostile 
Indians in the area. In addition, another struggle developed between two 
• settlers, Dorsey Penticost and James t1arshall, whose loyalty to Pennsylvania 
was questionable for both had migrated from Virginia. Penticost had become 
a political power in Wesonoreland County, and had been elected to the 
Council. ~larshall, on the other hand, had settled in another part of the 
County, and had attracted a substantial following, which precipitated a 
clash for personal power. On the surface, it would seem that Penticost's 
69 Colonial Records, March 1, 1782, February 28, 1783 XIII, 209, 518. 
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position was 100re favorable due to his being a member of the Cotmcil. It 
availed him little, because he had little influence in the Assembly. 
~Iarshall succeeded in having the Assembly create a new cotmty named 
.-, Washington out of part of Westmoreland Cotmty, and secured a considerable 
ntunber of commissions tl1ere for himself and his friends. Penticost accused 
lv1arshall of seducing the Assembly and of personal aggrandizement. ~Iarshall, 
on the other hand, accused Penticost of lack of cooperation, and more 
specifically, "sedition'', a charge not without folllldation. Each charged 
that the other still maintained greater loyalty to Virginia, although it 
seems that Marshall was more interested in personal power and Penticost 
was intent upon speculating in western lands. 70 
The CoW1cil, caught in the crossfire, fotmd in favor of Marshall when 
asked for a determination, and ordered elections to be held in the new 
coW1ty. Shortly after they were held, a petition was received in Council 
l 
asking that recognition of the newly elected officials be withheld until 
there was greater stability in the area. The persons elected to public 
office allegedly did not seek the offices, and men of ability were kept 
from office by various means. The petition asked that the boundary settle-
~ent be concluded before permitting a cowity·govenunent to be established. 71 
Indian incursions in·the southwestern counties continued to be a 
problem and the govennnent provided little relief. Because of this confused 
situation, the inhabitants, feeling that the State was doing nothing for 
70 Ibid., February 9, 1780 XII, 246; Dorsey Penticost to Reed, July 27, 1781 PeIU1Sylvania Archives, IX, 315-319; Marshall to Reed, June 5, 1781 ibid., IX, 193-194; Brun.house, 127. 
· 
.~71 Petition to Reed, August 15, 1781 Pennsylvania Archives IX, 355-356. 
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--·-, them, became less and less tolerant of the Government. There was con-
siderable talk of setting up a new state, which the Philadelphia Govern-
ment decided to squelch as quickly as possible. It passed a law 
decreeing the death penalty for anyone who fostered a seccessionist 
' movement. It also provided that soldiers would be paid in western lands. 
This was an attempt to intimidate the settlers, and to a large _ext~,nt, 
succeeded. 72 The Assembly took one other action, one that was not 
published at the time. It instructed the Council to appoint ~omen to 
migrate to the area to live and propagandize for the State in the hope 
that this would "bring over our deluded fellow citizens to a proper sense 
of their duty ••• ". Care was to be exercised to prevent the purpose from 
becoming known to the inhabitants, which was the principle reason for 
withholding publication of the resolution. 73 
The Government continually tried to meet the problem of public credit 
-with makeshift arrangements. In the summer of 1780, the Assenbly and the 
Cowicil decided to follow another course to secure funds on which:1to 
operate the Government and to fill the requisitions from Congress. They 
commissioned_ James Searles to go to Europe to borrow 200,000 specie, for 
which the State was willing to pay five percent interest over a ten-year 
period. Searles was a PeIU1Sylvania delegate to the Congress and had the 
confidence of the Radicals. For this reason, remarkable authority was 
given him, remarkable because the Radicals had always been reluctant to 
_
72 Journals of Assembly, November 16, 19, 1782,· 741-744; Brunhouse, 127. 
73 Pennsylvania Archives, November 19, 1782, IX, 666. 
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grant so llll.lch authority to one person. He was pennitted to negotiate 
the loan and arrange repayment in any suitable fashion operating only 
within the guidelines of five percent and ten years. He could borrow 
from any public, private or national group. His efforts were doomed 
to failure even before he arrived in Europe, for a barrier was placed 
in his way. Congress, in need of additional funds, was actively seeking 
,. . 
loans in the European market, and was offering six percent interest. 
Searles notified tl1e Assembly and the Council of this, and was authorized 
to increase the interest to six percent but only if he could not find 
any money at the lower rate. 74 
Searles sought the support of the American representatives in 
France and Holland, but received little encouragement or cooperation from 
either Benjamin Franklin or John Adams when he disclosed his mission. 
Pennsylvania had no collateral to offer except the word of the Govern-
ment, and Congress would not guarantee a loan should one be made. It 
has also been suggested that Robert Morris was influential in thwarting 
the success of the mission. 75 
The political cl1aracter of the Assembly changed £ran Constitutionalist 
to Anti-Constitutionalist in the October, 1781 elections. This new body 
requested the recall of Searles. They could see no economic good from the 
mission and were reluctant to spend additional ~urns on a venture with 
which they h.ad no sympathy. Reed, writing to the Assembly, disagreed. He .. 
74 Journals of Assembly, May 29, 1780; Pennsrlvania Archives, XII, 414-415, 422. 
75 Bn.inhouse, 98. 
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pointed out that the Com1cil was 1.manimous in its feeling that it would 
not be to the advantage of the State to withdraw it at this time. Reed 'S·· , 
letter had a sharp edge when he wrote of the expenses involved, for while 
it was possible to save "30 or 40 guineas, an object surely beneath the 
attention of the Legislature, who had lately given double the stun to 
children now 12 years old for no other service than beating a drum or 
blowing a fife," recall would be a mistake. 76 
Militant though Reed'-s response was, the Cotmcil did not have much 
hope that the mission of Searles would succeed, and finally resolved to 
pledge the good faith of the State to anyone who would lend the required 
amount, or any portion of it. A loan would be acceptable in gold, silver, 
Continental currency or State currency, and repayment would be made in the 
same meditun. 77 It was unfortunate tl1at the persons holding the specie 
that the Collllcil desired were tpose who had little confidence in the Gov-
enunent and were most desirous of its downfall. They were, therefore, 
reluctant to make any sum available. Those having the greatest desire for 
the success of the administration were generally those in the lower economic 
brackets who either did not possess specie, or did not have it in sufficient 
quantities to make a loan worthwhile. 
The Council continued to receive suggestions for replenishing the 
treasury coupled with reasons the Treasury was in continual need. Many 
. 
. 
who were behind in their taxes continued to put off payment with the idea 
76 Reed to Connnittee of the Assembly, April 6, 1781 Pennsylvania Archives 
IX, 62-64. 
77 Ibid., XII, 436. 
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that the state paper money would depreciate further, and when that 
happened they would be able to pay their assessments at par without 
\ the loss through depreciation. _78 It was also pointed out that inflation 
would be checked if the currency could be devalued. Re_ed pointed out 
that devaluation would solve nothing, for an earlier attempt had shown 
that compensating price increases followed inmediately. Devaluation 
would not only be inoperable, but it would increase the lack of confidence 
in the Government, and the only alternative seemed to be to trust the Leg-
islature to impart a faith by their actions that would improve the spirit 
of the population. Reed did not feel the prospects for this were bright, 
for with the Anti-Constitutionalists now controlling the Assembly, there 
seemed to be a greater lack of respect than had been apparent earlier. 79. 
Reed seemed to be reaching a state of disillusiornnent that was not present 
when the Radicals were in power. Under the Radicals the Council had 
· responded in a more free-wheeling fashion which relied less on the Assembly, 
and which had the respect and confidence of the Radical body as a whole. 
In June, 1781, the state of the Treasury and the lack of confidence 
in paper money brought on a minor crisis. The State was housing _and feeding 
1500 prisoners of war. Merchants and fanners would only accept hard money 
in payment for their goods, or if paper money was acceptable it was only at· 
a greatly depreciated value which Reed fowid _"unreasonable." In a con-
fidential letter to Frederick Muhlenberg, Speaker of the Assembly, Reed 
78 Gwllling Bedford and Presley Blakiston to Reed, May 2, 1781, Pennsrlvania 
Archives IX, 116. 
'•·,,,_.· !"····· j) 79 Ibid., IX, 129-130. i 
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urged the Speaker to seek ac.tion in the Assembly that would correct the 
situation. Reed had no confidence in the Assembly, but thought that a 
personal letter to the Speaker would acknowledge :Muhlenberg's leadership 
in that body, and that his influence would go farther in securing passage 
of corrective legislation. 80 Shortly thereafter, the Council learned 
that the Assembly was about to adjourn without facing the problem of 
finances. Infuriated, Reed wrote to the Assembly that the future of the 
State was. in jeopardy if they proceeded with adjourrnnent. The relation-
ship between the Cowicil and the Assembly was, at this point, at its 
worse stage of deterioration. The Council protested that the Assembly was. 
so impatient to adjourn that it did not bother to furnish the CoW1cil 
with any instructions on how to proceed with the necessities of Govern-
ment. Instead, infonnation was received through gossip and hearsay. 81 
Disconcerted, Reed wrote Ivluhlenberg that either the Assembly must 
find a means of providing the necessary funds to carry on Governn1ent business 
or relieve the Council of the responsibility. In short, the Council felt 
the necessity of asking the Assembly to remain in session long enough to 
give some attention to the problem, but tµifortunately Reed's contempt for ', 
.. 
the AI1ti-Co11stitutionalists was so great that· he suggested that such a 
request on the Council's part was possibly odious to"the Assembly. In 
his reply, ivuhlenberg was no less contemptuous. I1e maintained that the 
Assembly Finance Conunittee was simply an adjunct of the State Treasurer, 
SO Reed to Muhlenberg, June 7, 1781, Pennsylvania Archives, IX, 197. 
81 Reed to Assembly, June 21, 1781, JW1e 23, 1781, June 27, 1781, ibid., IX, 219, 220, 232. 
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· .and· the latter had been given the responsibility for securing funds. 
While this was. to some extent true, it was an obvious attempt to dis-
credit the Radicals, for the State Treasurer was David Rittenhouse, a 
member of the Radical inner circle. 82 
Earlier tl1e Assembly had made some attempt to replenish the 
Treasury. In April, a new issue of paper money was authorized, to be 
funded by the collection of arrearages from past sales of land. A land 
office was established to arrange collection and the officers were 
appointed by the Assembly •. The Conservative Assanbly sought to pre-empt 
the authority of the Council, or s·o the Council thought, for heretofore 
appointments of this nature were usually the responsibility of the 
executive branch. The Constitution did not spell out the power of 
appointment in every instance, but the bulk of the Council and the 
Assembly had usually been from the same party in the past, and it was 
) 
generally assumed that the·Com1cil appointments would be acceptable to 
the Assembly. Now it appeared that a lack of unanimity in the two bodies 
would plac~~ them at odds. 83 
,_,.., , 
During Reed's presidency, there was a genuine willingness generally 
to follow his lead for a variety of reasons • The most obvious was the 
respect he conunanded among the large frontier segment of the populace 
and among the mechanics group in the city. But, willing though these 
groups might be to follow, there was resistance in many quarters when 
82 Reed to Muhlenberg, July 3, 1781; Muhlenberg to Reed, July 4, 1781, ibid., 241-242, 248. 
83 Brunhouse, 99. 
-61-
self-interest was to be put aside in favor of the larger state or 
. national interest. ~fany of the problems would continue to defy solu-
tion Wltil what Reed called the "party spirit", and what he seemed to 
fail to recognize as self-interest, were overcome. The desire of the 
Assembly to adjourn before coming to grips with the financial problems 
was only one facet of the question. The CoWlcil was also guilty of 
feeling that their private interests deserved greater attention as long 
as there was a self-sacrificing person on whom the responsibility would 
fall. There were frequent absences from Council meetings for long 
periods which made a quorum difficult to obtain, and prevented those 
who were faithful in their attendance from taking a leave in order to 
spend more time with their families. On several occasions, the Secretary 
was requested to write to members of the Council and the delegates in 
Congress asking their intentions so that the work could proceed. In one 
instance, Timothy Matlack warned that ''The Whigs are gaining ground", 
ai1d requested the attendance of James Read and John Arndt to help fore-
stall any gains. 84 
Under these cira.unstances, it is not surprising that there should 
be some resistance on the part of the plain citizen when he was called 
~ upo11 to make sane sacrifice, of time or money. If one were called for 
militia duty, the possibility existed that the citizen would make a 
sacrifice of both time and money, for the condition of the Treasury was: 
84 Matlack to William Clingham, January 15, 1779; Matlack to John
1
Mackey, April 6, 1778; ~Iatlack to James Reed, April 3, 1779; Pennsylvania Archives, VII, 158; VI, 400-401; VII, 289-290; Colonial Records, December 23, 1778, XI, 649. 
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usually such that it was questionable whether the militia would be paid 
for tl1eir service in the field. Early in the war, the Assembly recognized 
the difficulty in securing ftmds, and suggested to the Com1cd:l that,, 
inasmuch as the militia was being used to the advantage of the United 
States, it would be pn.tdent to have the troops become part of the Con-
tinental Anny and thus escape some State expenditures. 85 There was a 
t. 
,. ·serious flaw in this proposal. Militia duty was obligatory on every 
citizen, but service in the Continental Anny was on a volunteer basis, 
and any militia that would become part of the regular anny could be 
expected to desert, because there was no guarantee that these men would 
be used exclusively in Pennsylvania. This was a service that was abhor-
rent to many w~o were called to militia duty. 
Because a great many who would serve in this State anny were fanners, 
care had to be exercised over when the militia call would take place, 
even though Indian uprisings on. the frontier frequently came at the wrong 
time for fanners. Although Reed had suggested that there be no militia 
call at planting time, such a nuster was not unusual. 86 Travel distances 
and camnunications also were obstacles to be overcome. Fanners subject to 
call often lived far from the place of muster, and occasionally, upon 
answeri11g a call, found that the emergency for which they were prepared 
had moved to a new locale,· or the need had ceased to exist. In order to 
meet every possible contingency, the militia would almost have to take on 
85 Ibid., June 6, 1777, XI, 215. 
86 
·11 166 i1acm1 an, n. 
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the characteristics of a standing anny, which was anathema to the 
citizens and to the militia. A militia call could only be issued by 
the Council, and because of the rapid shifts in location of the action, 
poor connnunications and distances to be traveled, the Collll.ty Lieutenant 
often found himself with a disgruntled group. To eliminate this, it 
was suggested that some of the County Lieutenants be given discretionary 
powers to call the militia directly instead of seeking a Council order. 
The response of the Council was negative, for deviations had been made 
in the past to meet special situations ~d they had brought complaints, 
inconvenience, and general dissatisfaction. One County Lieutenant had 
found it necessary to r~place the guard on the British prisoners, and 
explained to the Council that "necessity" was his only authority, and 
ttusted that the Council would not disapprove. 87 
Throughout the Confederacy period, the frontier was in constant 
tunnoil from Indian raids. This, coupled with the constant British 
pressure in the west, did not pennit the Government to relax its require-
ments for military ch.tty. The CoU11cil arrived at the conclusion that there 
would be greater response to militia calls if a prominent person was in 
charge of the citize11 anny. The one obvious person who conmanded the 
respect of those on the frontier, and had some military experience, was 
87 
-Adam Hubley to Reed, June 17, 1781; .. Reed to Hubley, June 20, 1781; 
Hubley to Reed, June 23, 1781; Pennsylvania Archives, IX, 211-212, ?18, 224-225. This discuss ion was an outgrowtl1 of the announcement ·· .. · 
by the Cotmcil that they had been granted authority to declare 
martial law if necessaryo Colonial Records 9 June 39 1781D XII, 374. It is difficult to determine iI tfiis was wfshful thinking on the 
part of the Council~ or ,vhether they thougl1t that this ivould pro-
vide additional substance to their Constitutional privilege. The 
Journals of Assembly fail to mention this grant of power from that 
body. 
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Reed, and the Council advised that he take personal cormnand in an 
active way, rather than a titular capacity. 88 Reed's absences fran 
Council meetings were very few after this was suggested to him, and 
it can be assumed that he resisted this advice successfully. 
During this period, the Council urged several suggestions on the 
Assembly, not only concerning militia problems, but as to means of 
• meeting the quota of men for the Continental Anny as well. One of the 
means suggested for maintaining this quota was to provide a monetary 
bonus for enlistment. Continuation of this procedure was, in the 
Council's view, the only way to meet the need; l1owever, in order to 
meet the increasing requirements and a fall off in enlistments, they 
urged that each, man who captured a deserter be exempted from militia 
duty, providing the deserter re-enlisted. This did not prove particu-
larly productive, because re-enlistment of deserters would at best 
maintain the minimum strength previously acquired, and would not pro-
vide the increased manpower wl1ich was desired. To overcome this 
deficiency, a sweetener was added which pennitted an abatement of truces 
for one year for anyone who volW1teered. 89 
While the Co'W1cil was attempting to provide men for the Continental 
forces, they were also trying to maintain the strength and morale of the 
militia. A suggestion that a volunteer for the Anny be exen1pted from 
~l~tia d~ty was written into a legislative bill and then 1vithdrawn. 
88 Pennsylvania Archives, August 13, 178m, XII, 452. 
89 Colonial Records, January 14, I778, Febniary 26, 1778, April 4, 1778, XI, 401, 429, 457. 
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Recently released veterans, who would have to serve in the militia when 
called0 urged the passage of this act 0 and requested the Cotn1cil to 
provide such exemption without specific legislation. The Cotm.cil, fully 
aware of the needs, indicated that they could not grant such a request 
even though they recognized tl1e injustice of serving additional time in 
the militia after a tenn of service in the Anny. go The returning 
veterans had no choice but to respond to the militia call when it was 
issued. There were other instances were the law seemed to be at cross 
purposes with the needs of the State. Many of the acts relative to the 
mustering and control of the militia were considered weajc and contra-
dictory by the Council. However weak and contradictory these laws were, 
the Council was partially responsible for some of the confusion that 
prevailed. Militia calls were for varying lengths of time, and sometimes 
• 
overlooked the condition of the Treasury. Once, when a muster call was 
made in Bedford County to canbat Indian incursions, those called learned 
that they would have to serve nine months • In the minds of some, this 
brought them too close to a standing anny, and they were alanned that it 
would be for so long a period. Their Lieutenant wrote to the Council 
suggesting a shorter period, not only b~cause of the length of service, 
•"• ' 
but because funds to pay the men were virtually non-existent, and to 
provide payment for nine months was out of the question. 91 
Many people sought to limit the amOWlt of time they would contribute 
90 PeJU1Sylvania Archives, XII, 390. 
91 Jolm Piper to Cowicil, Fepruary 2, 1778 • ibid. , VI, 229. 
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to the State, either in public service or in soldiering. Lancaster 
County was in the forefront of those seeking special consideration as 
a result of past or present service. The County Conunissioners suggested 
that legislation be passed exempting from military service those appointed 
to carry out the public business. Their specific reference was to the 
tax collectors who were subject to militia call. Not only was money 
scarce, but&it was difficult to get individuals to serve as tax collectors. 
Many who were willing had been called into militia duty, and those who 
were not cornmitted to a specific goverrunental task were reluctant to 
accept the responsibility. It seems that tax collecting was as odious in 
Revolutionary times as it was in Biblical times. 92 
Five years after Independence, the ColUlcil was still stn.iggling to 
strengthen the militia laws. Many of the problems current at this time 
,were problems that were present in the earliest period. There were . 
inequities in the service required, a general reluctance on the part of 
a large portion of the populace to serve, and the genuine hardship it 
worked on those \vho did serve. Time and money were sacrificed, rarely to 
be recovered. Another problem, peculiar to the southwestern portion of 
the State, was that while a militia company had been authorized, little 
was done to fonn it because of the power struggle that was going on in the 
area. The CoW1cil even considered asking the Congress to furnish enough 
troops to protect the area from Indian raids until the two groups could be 
reconciled. 93 
92 Lancaster Cowity Cooonissioners to Timothy 1v1atlack, May s, 1779, ibid., VI, 531. 
93 Colonial Records, September 14, 1781, November·z4, 1781, XIII, 58, 127. 
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As late as 1784, raising a company of militia in sufficient strength 
and time to restore order in the frontier collllties was virtually impossible. 
Finally, the Assembly, after repeated petitions from the Council, author-. 
ized the Council, with the approval of the Congress, to raise a maximum 
force of 500 men on a "pennanent'' basis to secure peace. The approval of 
Congress was forthcoming the same day the request was made. With all 
three bodies meeting in Philadelphia, distance an~ lack of commtmications 
did not cause delays in action, as was the case when orders had to be trans-
mitted over long distances. 94 
The frontier problems were a continuing source of trouble for the 
Council. Not only were the lVashington-l\Testmoreland County and the Pennsyl-
vania-Virginia boundary disputes vexing, but the controversy benveen the 
State and the settlers in the \fyoming Valley led to bloodshed. This was a · 
problem that was inherited from the period prior to Independence. As early 
,\1 as 1753, . a group of CoIU1ecticut settlers known as the Susquehanna C~mpany 
migrated to the area around present day \\Tilkes-Barre. They did not hav~ 
the open backing of tl1e Connecticut govenunent, but the settlement was 
privately encouraged because that State was under the illusion that her 
territory extended westward without iimit. Even before tl1e Revolution, 
Pennsylvania sought the allegiance of this group and to have the squatters 
purchase or pay rent for the settled lands. With the change in Gover1nnent, 
and the need for support of 'the Revolutionary cause, the new Assembly and 
94 PeIU1Sylvania Archives, XI, 207-209. 
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Council made little attanpt to have the settlers conform to Pennsylvania 
., laws. Ho\vever, PeMsyl vanians began to move into the area, and this 
prompted appeals to the Council and the Assembly to have the earlier 
settlers dislodged •. The clashes between the two groups came to the 
attention of Congress which sought to persuade them to put aside their 
probclems and give great~r support to tl1e Continental cause. 95 The 
Council, aware of the action of Congress, followed the situation care-
fully, noting that the resolution had no effect. Under Reed's prompting, 
the Council argued that the Pennsylvanians in the area should be given 
greater protection and volW1teered to visit the area to aid in pacification. 
if the Assembly felt there was some merit in such a move. Because of 
many other pressing problems, nothing came of this. 96 
In ~1arch of 1780, Reed advised the Assembly that he had written to 
the Governor of Coru1ecticut offeri.I1g the opportunity of pennitting the 
Congress to arbitrate the dispute. Such .a confession to the . t\.ssembly could, 
very well have raised a new stonn on their part because of the aggressive 
attitude of Reed, but they approved of his action. This was possibly 
because no violation of legislative courtesy seemed to have been involved. 
Usurpation of power was not an issue, and Reed kept the Assembly infonneq 
at all times of l1is actions in this controversy. He soon advised the 
.Assembly that the Connecticut Governor had rejected arbitration. 97 
Finding this avenue closed, the Goveriunent now tried s,ome subtle 
95 Wayland F. Dunaway, A History of Pemisylvania (New York, 1935) 131-136. 96 Colonial Records, February S, 1779, XI, 685-690. 
97 Ibid., f\·1arch 21, 1780, March 22, 1780, XII, 285, 287. 
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blackmail against the Confederation. A detailed letter was written to 
thei, delegates in.Congress explaining their willingness to settle the. 
dispute amicably. 1b~ letter spelled out the negative response to the 
· sugge~ted arbitration that l1ad been received, and pointed out that an 
W1fortwiate precedent would be established if the situation ,vere per-
. mitted to continue. If other States allo,ved their citizens to migrate 
in strength and did not encourage them to transfer their allegiance to 
the new region, a whole host of new problems would be created that need 
not be if good sense were to prevail. In the letter, the Cotmcil pro-
posed raising a special militia company for inteni.al defense, which when 
activated would reduce the number of Pennsylvanians available for the 
Continental line. 98 Such a move on Pennsylvania's part would carry the 
State to the brink of civil war, and it is questionable whether they were 
prepared to engage in this kind of activity. Their purpose was to have 
'. this message transmitted to the whole Congress, and hopefully Congress 
would apply pressure on CoIU1ecticut to secure their cooperation inste~d 
of pennitting that State to block every move made by Pennsylvania. The 
letter did not accomplish its purpose, and the threat of a militi:a company 
to move against the Wyoming settlers proved an idle threat • 
. For quite some time, the problem lingered in the background while 
·the Govenunent sought means of coping with the combined British-Indian 
forays in the west and north. The area in which the Connecticut settlers 
98 Ibid., March 24, 1780, XII, 289. 
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were located had been designated Northumberland Co'Wlty by the Assembly, 
and it was in this area that many of the worst incidents took place 
among the inhabitants. The Cowicil offered a reward of $1500 _for every 
white and Indian prisoner if they were acting in concert, and $1000 for 
every Indian scalp. Although this money was to be _paid only to the 
inhabitants of Northumberland County, it soon was clear that a larger 
area should be included, and Northampton Cotmty was made part of the area 
to which the rewards \vould be paid. The raids, however, did not confonn 
to the defense pattern set up by· the Council. They occurred like brush 
fires in.various parts of the State. The Council was confident that if 
enough bounty money could be offered, the problem would be brought under 
control. Accordingly, the boW1ty was increased to $3000 for combined 
British-Indian prisoners and $2500 for Indian scalps. Every County in 
the State was soon included in the boW1ty money system. 99 It is difficult 
to detennine whether this was just an instance of wishful tl1inking on the 
CoW1cil's part, or whether they really believed that results would be 
forthcoming. The condition of the Treasury was such that the State could 
not afford to have too many prisoners or scalps, and yet could not afford 
to pennit the raids to continue. 
Over the long period of the war, the Gover1anent managed a holding 
action in the Wyoming Valley, and when it seemed propitious they again 
.. . ··.,;~ 
pressed their delegates in Congress to seek some redress. Inunediately after 
I ••.. , 
99 Ibid., April 8, 1780, April 11, 1780, April 22, 1780, XII, 311, 312, 328. 
•71-~ 
ratification of the Articles of Gonfederation, the Council was asked 
--. again by the Assembly to pursue a solution to the problem. The Council, 
however, did not act with the dispatch that the Assembly resolution 
suggested, and it was not until July that a fonnal resolution was for-
warded to the Pennsylvania delegation. It cited the historical basis 
· for their claim that this was part of the charter grant to Vvilliam Penn. 
They pointed to the legislative act of November 27, 1779, in which right 
and title to tl1e lands described in the Charter was now vested in the 
Commonwealth. It was also pointed out that the New England migrants had 
prevailed on the Connecticut Legislature to incorporate the Susquehanna 
lands into that State. Because of this, a hearing before Congress was 
sought in accordance with Article 9 of the new Articles of Confederatioi-1.lOO 
Tl1e Pennsylvania delegation was quick to respond, and advised the Council 
to submit their request at a later date, because the time was not the 
most opportW1e. 101 No reason was given for this and apparently the Council 
accepted it without question. 
In October, the petition was forwarded agai11, and this time the Pennsyl-
vania delegation did present the grievances. Congress responded favorably 
to the petition and set the fourth Monday of June, 1782 as the time for 
100 Ibid., July 20, 1781, XII, 9-10. Article 9 stated that ''The United i States in Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differe11ces now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever; ••• " i1errill Jensen incorporates the complete Articles in his The Articles of Confed-era tio11 (rvtadison, 1963) 263- 270. 
lOl Ibid., July 26, 1781, XIII, 16 • 
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hearing the interested parties. · The Cowicil promptly appointed Joseph 
Reed, William Brad£:ord, Attorney-General of the State, and James l~ilson 
to represent the Commonwealth at the hearing. 102 Wilson was probably 
chosen for his legal ability and in spite of his political opposition 
to the Government. Reed was probably chosen because he w,as ineligible 
to return to the Council for a ,vhile, and because he had a great deal of 
backgroW1d in the dispute, having pursued the subject over the previous 
three years. Nothing was heard on the subject from these men until the 
following April when they notified the Council that all the necessary 
material was not available for them, and asked that an effort be made 
to secure it. The Council promptly appointed Henry Osborne to gather 
all the evidence and search all the records in order that a complete 
legal case could be built. 103 
The Carunittee of the Congress met at Trenton, and the facts were 
presented. A judgment was found in favor of Pennsylvania that these 
were Pennsylvania lands subject to Pennsylvania laws. But as far as 
some PeIU1sylvanians were concerned, there was a flaw in the decision 
because the Connecticut settlers could remain in the area and could 
receive title to the lands on which they had settled. The Assenbly 
chose to ·ignore this portion of the judgment and the militia was sent 
to drive them off. It has been suggested that some members of the Legis-
lature had some land claims in the area which prompted this action. 104 
102 Ibid., October 8, 1781, November 25, 1781, XIII, 79, 123, 125. 
103 
Ibid., April 8., 1782, XIII, 266. 
104 Merrill Jensen, The New Nation, (New York, 1950) 335-336. 
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It wasn't until 1792 that conditions reached a state where everyone, 
if not completely satisfied, accepted the solution as preferable to a 
resort to arms again. By this time, however, the Cotmcil had ceased 
to exist. 
The minutes of the Supreme Executive Cotmcil rarely reflect grave 
differences of opinion among its rrernbers relative to actions to be 
taken, but the official minutes of few organizations will show anything 
but the action agreed upon, and rarely indicate the discussions of any 
probl~. The earliest recorded vote that shows some divergence of 
opinion appears in 1782. The reasons for the lack of unanimity become 
obvious when the temper of the Council is known. Until the fall of 
1781, the Radicals had usually had their own ,vay. They controlled the 
Assembly most of the time, and when they did not exercise absolute 
control, differences in numbers were not suffic~~ntly lar.ge enough to 
create a complete turnover of the Government. S'o it' .was with the Cotmcil 
also. The temper of State politics during i\TJ,.arton's and Bryan's tenns 
... 
was such that they did not have to do much leading. It was enough to 
follow the dictates of the Assembly and· administer the laws. The Reed 
period was one in which the office of the President was given a great 
deal of prestige, and while Reed was thwarted on occasion, he did manage 
• 
to be a leader rather than a follower. 
v. The Collllcil in Peacetime 
With the surr~nder of Cornwallis, the political tide began to flow 
. . . . 
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in the other direction. The end of hostilities brought about a reversal 
' in the voting habits of many citizens. This was not a phenomenon peculiar 
to that period, for it has occurred not only in the United States on other 
occasions, but in other western democracies in very recent times. The 
group in the middle of the political spectrum holding the balance of 
power bet,veen two hardened positions, nmv shifted to a more conservative 
view, and could be counted on to seek the election of the party which 
would best serve its o,vn interests. This is not something that can be 
statistically shown, but the fact that both political groups tended to 
i-Joo an ir1detenninate IllUilber of voters to their standard in the past, leads 
one to feel that there.was a body of voters that did not adhere to one 
party on every occasion. 
The end of the war also brought about a ·change in the way the Council 
responded to questions of importance. The first evidence of this was the 
election of a moderate Constitutionalist to the office of President. From 
this time fonvard, with some singular exceptions, there was a steady drift 
to a more conservative position in the Council. That the Conservatives 
in the Council were able to make their presence felt is indicated by the 
·way the disputed Philadelphia County election was handled. Almost immedi-
ately after the election of 1781, the Council was asked to rule invalid 
the returns from Philadelphia County because of faulty voting procedures. 
When the Council sought further infonnation from the petitioners, there 
seemed to be a reluctance.to furnish it. A full month went by before a 
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date was set for a hearing, and the Council agreed among themselves 
that sl1ould satisfactory evidence not be forthcoming, the election 
would be ruled valid. lOS 
The CoW1cil finally managed to draw some specifics from the 
aggrieved parties. George Bayard, the supposedly illegally elected 
Councillor from Philadelphia County (who had earlier disqualified him-
self) , suggested that the County be penni tted to defend itself. The 
' charges rested on two complaints: that there were irregularities in 
the time and manner of holding the election, and that the militiary leaders 
exercised an l..ll1due influence on the members of the militia and Anny 
present, and on civilians by intimidation. 'Ihe leader of the militia 
who was said to have exerted this influence was John Lacey, a Conserva-
tive of Chester CoW1ty and a member of the Council, who at no time dis-
qualified himself. Finally the Council seemed ready to rule on the 
election when a motion was made that before a final consideration, they 
should seek to learn what charges could be substantiated by the evidence 
and testimony presented by asking the Chief Justice or any of ·the "puisne" 
. ' judges to review the facts. At this point, the minutes of the Council 
record an ~ctual vote on a specific issue for the first time. At no 
place in the earlier mirrutes does there seem to be the necessity of 
recordiI1g a vote or an opinion. \'vb.ether there was greater unanimity l in 
previous sessions, or a recorded vote was thought unnecessary is not known. 
lOS Colonial Records, November 17, 1781, November 19, 1781, November 23, 1781, December 14, 1781, December 17, 1781, XIII, 118, 119, 126, 127, 148. 
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In any event, the vote ended in a tie and the motion was lost. 106 
• 
Feeling ran high, however, and that aft~moon Joseph Gardner, a 
Conservative from Bucks County sought to overturn the tie vote by 
submitting a prates t peti tio11 in which he claimed too many inferences 
were drawn from the charges which were not covered by law. He charged 
that the CoW1cil would be derelict in its duty if it did not seek 
every assistance. It was claimed that either way a precedent would be 
set, and it would be wise to have the precedent on £inn legal grounds._ 
which would give "weight and dignity" to the decision. Finally, 
Gardner claimed that the Council did not have sufficient legal wisdom 
to decide on a case where the law was not clear and where the rights of 
all citizens should be explicit. 107 
The Radicals on the Council were better prepared during the after-
noon session than they had been in the morning. They claimed that to 
separate the charges in the manner suggested would weaken the force of 
the whole charge and thus prevent the Council from rendering a clear 
/-~ judgment. Gardner, however, again moved that the evidence be furnished . 
both Chief Justice !vlcKean and Justice Bryan for an opinion. This time 
the motion carried because George Read, Councillor £ran Berks County 
who had been absent during the morning session, supported Gardner's 
motion. lOS Finding reasons for the difference between the morning and 
afternoon vote is not difficult. The negative votes in the afternoon 
106 Ibid., December 21, 1781, December 28, 1781, February 11, 1782, March lZ, 1782, XIII, 153-154, 160-16!, 188-192, 223. 
107 Ibid., fvfarch 12, 1782, XIII, 223-225. 
108 Ibid., March 12, 1782, XIII, 225-228. 
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all came from the Radicals on the Council who were not at full strength. 
When they lost in the afternoon, they used their now familiar technique 
of withdrawing. in order to prevent a quorwn. 109 By this time it \\Tas 
too late. 
reached. 
• 
Legal opinions were to be sought before a final decision was 
'When the legal opinions were received, they were worthless to the 
Conservatives. Both Justices ruled that from the evidence submitted, 
tl1ere seemed to be no irregulati ties. Vii th this as a basis, the Council 
now voted to dismiss the charges. There is substantial evidence, however, 
' 
that the dismissal was a whitewash, for there was a lrrge body of material 
to show irregularities. Bayard was a Radical and as the elected Council-
lor stood to profit by the dismissal. Also, it seems strange that the 
Conservatives should go through all the trouble only to meekly accede to 
the final vote. It app'ears that the Conservatives had another object in 
view. Bayard was a popular member of the Radical party and had an excel-
lent chance of being elected President of the Cotmcil. By casting doubt 
on his election, they managed to disqualify him long enough to elect ~1oore 
in his place even though ~1oore was also a Radical. The charges were in 
part politically inspired, and politically decided. 110 
Shortly after this episode, a new unanimity developed in the Council, 
eveh though there were a sufficient number of Radicals on it,to create 
problan.s. 1he Assanbly, as a result of the previous election, had become 
109 Brunhouse, 107. 
llO Colonial Records, March 12, 1782, XIII, 228-232; Brunhouse, 107. 
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an anti-Constitutionalist body by a small majority. It proceeded to 
pass several laws designed to weaken the Radicals and embarrass the 
Council, thus reducing its authority. These laws do not seen to have 
been passed because of ignorance of constitutional procedure; rather 
there was a design in them. In an effort to increase their control 
of the Govenunent, the Conservatives nO\v took to themselves the author-
ity of appointments which heretofore had been the repponsibility of 
the Council. They also reduced the salaries of the Justices of the 
Supreme Court, and in doing so, settled a score with their old political 
nemesis, George Bryan. Finally, the Assembly provided legislation to 
cl1ange the method of drawing funds from the Treasury and the general 
execution of the laws. 
1hese were blatant political moves on the part of the Conservatives, 
and were intended to free them from the restrictive mold in which they 
had long been confined. In order to enhance their political position, 
they wanted to use ,vhat has become standard among politicians, the re-
warding of the faithful. It was an effort to entrench themselves so· 
that the possibility of defeat ,vould be reduced or eliminated. 
The response of the Council to these moves was an explosion unlike 
any that either body had experienced in the past. If the Conservatives ~-~ 
. thought that by keeping Jolm Bayard from the Presidency, they .wo·uld have 
. a better base to control the Council, they were canpletely in error. 
Moore's letter to the Assembly started with a review of those responsibil.-
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ities as~igned to the Council, and then goes into the partic~lars of the 
laws ..of which he disapproves • 
• • • our desire to preserve the hannony so essential to the public ,velfare 9 has kept us silent under the various measures adopted by your House, which 
we conceive prejudicial to the StateP and deroga-tory to the Constitutional rights of this Board. ButeootOoooperceive a systenlooo\vhich evidently tends to annihilate the powers and usefulness of the Exec-
utive part Of the governmentDoooOblige US to Sp~ak with freedom 9 and to declare thatv as we will never make a vol UI1tary surrender of our privileges, so 
we will not tamely and silently submit to them. 
He went on to threaten that if these laws ,1ere not \'lithdrawn that 
the Council .had no choice but to go to the people. If rvbore meant that 
he would seek another election to overcome what he felt were extremely 
restrictive laws, then it must have been an idle threat, for he could not 
have mustered the necessai:y votes to overcome the Conservative majority, 
but given a little time, he might be ab~e to convince the Assembly to 
change its mind. If, on the· other hand, his threat meant that he would 
seek support for his position among the Radicals of the countryside, he 
probably would have had a great deal more success. The latter group would: 
have been able to make enough of a nuisance of themselves, that their 
point of view might have prevailed. '. ~1oore then proceeded to cut the grotu1d 
out from tU1der the Anti-Constitutionalists by charging that it was their 
political claim over the whole Constitutional period that that document 
"has left too little power in the Executive branch'', and now their legis-
lation was attempting to restrict it even more. 111 
lll Ibid., April 12, 1782, XIII, 259-260. 
\. 
. 
I 
I ' 
~ . , 
-so-
Late in the previous year, the Assembly had passed a bill which 
/ 
altered downward the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and 
members of the Council, and in addition made that portion relative to 
the Justices retroactive to Jtme 22, 1781. The reason given was that 
salaries were to be paid in specie, and inasmuch as specie had greater 
value than paper money, they would be getting as much value if their 
currently high salaries were paid in paper. 112 It is paradoxical that 
the Conservatives had repeatedly protested the issuance of paper money 
because it depreciated so rapidly, yet used the specious argwnent of 
claiming high value for paper money when it was to their advantage to do 
so. The President clearly thought that such action was unconstitutional. 
He pointed out that the Constitution gave.the Council power to appoint, and 
that judges salaries were to be established prior to their appointment. 
To follow the course set forth in the legislation would not keep the 
Judiciary independent, but would make it dependent on the Assembly. The 
obvious conclusion was that they would rule in favor of the party in 
power in order to maintain even the status guo. 
We conceive the independence of Judges, both on the Executive and the Legislativev as a point of the greatest importance to the good people of the State, 
••• and as their commissions are for seven years, ••• it is clear that their support ought to be ~ually fixed 0 and irrevokable during that period. 113 
It will be noted that Moore's couunents concerned only the salaries of the 
Judiciary, and no mention was made of the reduction of his own salary. 
112 Journals of ~sanbly, December 27, 1781, 558. 
113 Colonial Records, April 12, 1782, XIII, 260 • 
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Perhaps he felt that if .he used discretion, the Assembly would restore 
not only the judges salaries but his as well. 
In this session, the Assembly set up a new system of tax collecting. 
Incorporated into this bill was the establishnent of the office of 
Comptroller-General, with such broad powers that the Council was uneasy 
about it. Moore complained that this new officer would draw money in 
his name only, bypassing the Council altogether. Resentment and pique 
were indicated when Moore complained that the measure ivas "an unjust and 
unnecessary wound to the Council's feelings". The financial picture 
did brighten, however, with the appointment of John Nicholson to the post, 
and Council detennined that they would cooperate with him inasmuch as 
they were unable to get the legislation repealed. Even though some of 
the counties complained that their assessments were too high, Nicholson 
was able to collect some of the arrearages and to keep current payables 
closer to the taxes levied. 114 
The final issue Moore complained- about was the law which gave the 
Assembly the power to appoint the auctioneers· for the City and County of 
Philadelphia. '!he present officeholders were to be dismissed and men of 
the same political persuasion as the majority of the Assembly were to be 
appointed in their place. The offices were extremely lucrative and were 
the best that the Cowicil could grant. Moore pointed out that the current 
officeholders had only been appointed a year earlier and were men of 
' 
·
114 Bnmho45e, 108, 133. 
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j 
proven ability, because they had come to lmow their jobs well. If 
this procedure was pennitted, ''what persons in the future will be 
induced to accept appointments tmder the Council?" Apparently• Moore. 
did not see this legislation as a continuing thing, and felt that the 
Com1cil would again have the power of appointment. The Conservatives 
were equally detennined that the ColD'lcil, once stripped ·of its power, 
would never again have the authority it once had. 115 
Even though tax collections had improved, the State was still in 
need of funds. The Conservative Assembly authorized the Cotmcil to 
borrow (30,000 at six percent interest. It appears that the Assembly 
felt that this arnowit could only be secured from persons of wealth. 
Council thought otherwise and attempted to raise the money in small 
amollllts. Their argument was that there should be an opportWli ty for 
greater nlDDbers to give evidence of support of the Govenm,ent, and as a· 
result of· this thinking placed a limit of /5 on any one loan. In their 
efforts to escape the trap set by the Assembly, they failed to secure the 
funds from either source. The House had adjourned in the interim and the 
ColDlcil met with six Assemblymen who were in town and discussed their 
plight. Because of the difficulties they were having, it was suggested 
by the Cowicil that a special session of the Assembly be called for the 
sole purpose of solving the money problem. They were discouraged by the 
.Assembly members who saw little possibility of a practical solution. 
115 Colonial Records, April 12, 1782• XIII. 261-262; BIUI1house. 118. 
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The Cowicil, becaning wise to the ways of the Conserwtive Assembly, 
detennined that a special session convene and send out a call for 
August 1st, which ·seemed to them the earliest date ·that a quorum could 
be gathered. 116 
\\The11 the Assembly finally met to act upon the problem, President 
itoore's message dealt with the state of public credi.t from another 
poir1t of view. Instead of trying to replenish the · Treasury directly, 
his greater concern seemed to be to keep specie within the Commonwealth~ 
and not let it drain off i11 foreign trade. Earlier laws had outlawed 
trade with England, principally because this~rade tended to draw off 
specie wl1en creditors would not accept paper money. In spite of these 
laws, this trade continued, and because it was difficult to tell an. C 
American from a British subject due to similar speech and dress, greater 
vigilance was 11eeded in closing down tl1ese outlets in order to retain 
the badly needed specie. If, however, the merchants were unsuccessful 
in furthering their trade through Philadelphia, it was feared that they· 
would carry it on tl1rougl1 New York, New Jersey, or Delaware. At last 
the Assembly agreed that the situation required correction and efforts 
were made to close loopholes. They sought to have Ne\i Jersey and Dela,iare 
. legislate against such trade. lbis failed, and in desperation, the 
Assembly declared that all for~ign trade was illegal. 117 
With this new spirit of cooperation between the CoW1cil and the 
116 Colonial Records, May 27, 1782, JW1e 15, 1782, July 17, 1782, XIII, 292, 304, $07 . 
. 
117 Ibid., August 12, 1782, August 16, 1782, XIII, 348, 351; Journals of Assembly, August 27, 1782; Brunhouse, 116. 
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Assembly, a new atmosphere prevailed in the State. There were still 
.sharp divisions along party lines, a ~ondition that would prevail 
until well after the passage an";t ratification of the Federal Consti-
tutior1. But from this time on, rarely did either body question the 
methods or motives of the other, and there were no charges that one 
group was invading the domain of the other. There \vas a substantial 
reason for this, for the election in the fall of 1782 left the Con~ 
servatives in complete control of both tI1e Assembly and the Council.: 
Jollll Dickinson, newly elected Councillor from Philadelphia County, 
was easily elected President. 
The Council now reverted to its prior role of carrying ou·t the 
will of the Assembly, but with a new verve that was not prese~t before. 
Perhaps the end· of the war and the prospect of stability had something 
to do with this; however, during Dickinson's tenn more ideas flowed 
from the CoWlcil to the Assembly than during the whole period of Inde-
pendence. 1Iere was the basic difference between Reed and Dickinson. 
Reed was a mai1 of action, often circumventing the Assembly, while Dick-.. 
ins on was an idea man feeding the Assembly. The Government was still , .
• 
plagued with poor public credit, Indian raids on its advancing frontier, 
the lfyoming controversy, and a relatively new problem--settlement of 
lands beyond the Ohio River, which in t~e Goverrunent's view was Pe1U1Syl-
vania territory. Even with these problems, there was a greater sense 
of well-being, for the partisan politics which had been so debilitating 
;~. 
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to the gov~niing bodies before, soon found a new area in which to display 
their disruptive influences, the Comicil of Censors. 118 
This new spirit of cooperation between a Republican Assembly and a 
Republican Cou11cil is. evidenced by the quick response of the Assembly 
to a message from Dickinson regarding the settlements beyond the Ohio. 
\Vi thin three days after the message a joint conference ben1een members of 
tl1e Assembly and the Council was held in an effort to detennine a course 
of action for halting such settlements. Neither the Council minutes nor 
the Journals of Assembly indicate the reason for such quick action. It 
is possible that the mmership of land in this area by members of the 
Government was uppennost· in their minds. Their intent was to protect their 
claims by preventing squatters from settling without purchasing. 119 
The suggestions and ideas forwarded to the Assembly began soon after 
Dickinson asstmled the office of the President. 1vfany of them were reworkings 
of earlier suggestions, such as a review of the tax,.structure to provide 
a more UI1ifonn assessment base, method of collection, and a suggestion 
that the patchwork of militia laws be consolidated into one comprehensive 
law which would be applicable to everyone. Two new projects were soon _ 
proposed to the Assembly by Dickinson. lle felt that in view of the help 
118 It is, not within the scope of this paper to discuss the Cotmcil of Censors • A more thorough revieiv can be found in Brunhouse, 14 2-158, and in Le,vis ~,1eader, "The Council of Censors", Permsyl vania Magazine of History and Biography, XXII (1898), 265-300 • 
119 Colonial Records, i\Tovember 12, 1782, November 15, 1782, XIII, 425, 430. It is interesting to note the location of some of the \vealth 
· in the State, for Dickinson offered to lend the Government .£1000 
·· at six percent to be used as bounty money for troops to deferJ.Ci the lands under frequent seige by Indians o This also gives· some 
crede11ce to the vietv that there was s·till a substantial amount 
available 1vl1ich would only come out of hiding at tl1e right time.; Ibid., January 4, 1783, XIII, 472. 
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received from France ·during the war, French interests deserved some 
attention. There were those who encouraged and aided desertion from 
French ships in the Port of Philadelphia, and Dickinson argued that 
Americans who did this should be ptmished. In another area that had 
been touchy for quite sane time, he urged a comprehensive policy for 
the city of Philadelphia if home rul:e was not to be granted. Dickinson's 
list of items that needed attention was so long that if the Assembly was 
to act on all of them, or a substantial part, the session would be 
lengthy. 120 
William Moore won a belated victory in response to his message 
denoW1cing the Assembly for removal of the appointive power from the 
Cotmcil. The Assembly finally acted on a suggestion made several times 
in the past that a Court of Appeal be established. Not only was the 
necessary legislation provided to accomplish this, but the CoW1cil was 
instructed to make the appointments to the bench. Surprisingly, both 
lvt:>ore and Bayard were appointed to these posts by a Conservative Co1.D1cil. 
Both men were mild Radicals, but it may have been that the Conservatives 
felt that they were so finnly in control that they could afford to be 
magnanimous. Radical though he was, Moore was a Philadelphia merchant 
and had a bond of sympathy with the conservative group. 121 
In Jtme, an incident occurred that drove the Continental Congress 
from Philadelphia, to which they did not retuni tmtil Philadelphia became 
120 Ibid., January 24, 1783, XIII, 487-489. 
121 Ibid., March 18, 1783, XIII, 535. 
,· ~ 
. 1 
! 
, 
.. g7., 
the nation's capitol in 1790. Soldiers of the Pennsylvania line were 
stationed in Philadelphia and demonstrated in front of the State flouse 
for back pay. They were later joined by a contingent from Lancaster, 
and together managed to intimidate the Congress. The latter body felt 
it was the responsibility of Pennsylvania to provide protection for ,, . 
them, and when the Council complained that there was little they could 
do, Congress left the city. The argument of the Council had some valid-
ity for they would have had to call on the militia to disperse the Con-
tinentals, the response of which they could not guarantee, and had they 
been able to order the militia to action, a small scale civil war might 
have ensued. Efforts were made to have the Congress return without avail. 
Even Thomas Paine wrote asking their return. In August, Dickinson sent . 
a message to the Assembly which was an apology of sorts for lack of· acti-c~11 
in June, but also contained a bold suggestion for the consolidation of 
the Confederation. Dickinson felt that "general and relative concerns may 
be f innly governed by a Federal supremacy ••• ". \Vi th this in mind, he made 
a suggestion that is anathema even in tl1e twentieth century, that there 
be a transfer of some state soveriegnty to a federal government. I1e did 
not suggest how much, what part, or how this was to be done, but here is 
an indication that faith in the Articles of Confederation was diminishing, 
and there were tl1ose who \\>'ere thinking about an alternative. It is not 
clear whether Dickinson, who had a large part in the fonnulation of the 
Articles felt that this Constitution had outlived its usefulness., but what 
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.. is clear is that the inmediate purpose of the suggestion was- to lure the 
Congress back to Philadelphia. 122 
The fertile mind of Dickinson was continually evolving new ideas 
which were forwarded to the Assembly. In order to prevent sane of the 
financial chaos that existed during the war, Dickinson urged that a mint 
be established. This would provide a c01mnon currency under a federal 
system, and citizens would have available to them ftmds usable in any 
of the states. Was this one of the areas in which the states would give 
up sane of their sovereignty? While Dickinson makes no reference to a 
"Federal supremacy" when he suggests a mint, this may have been in his 
mind. It is probah1, that men of the conservative stripe did discuss the 
weaknesses of.the present system, and probably proposed alternative 
systems to each other in their leasure hours. \\Tith the rivalzy that 
existed between the States, it is unlikely that such a plan would have 
received the approbation of the Congress as well as the other Governments. 
Another recommendation from Dickinson proposed that the State subsidize 
the Philosophical Society. By doing this, that group would• hopefully, 
provide ideas and inventions which would further trade and commerce. Even 
back-country Radical yeomen stood to profit by such an expenditure, and 
the Assembly voted a {150 subsidy for agriculture and co11unerce, and to 
secure the latest inventions from Europe. 123 
\•, 
The Council of Censors, which met during the winter of 1783-1784 and 
again in the summer of 1784, overshadowed both the Assembly and the Council. 
There was little activity of importance in either of these latter bodies 
122 Brun.house, 135-140; Colonial Records, August 8, 1783, XIII, 648. 
123 Ibid., August 8, 1783, January 19, 1784, March 12, 1784, XIII, 649, XIV; 13• 51. 
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during this period, partly because both groups were controlled by Con-· ··-·· 
servatives, and they saw in the Censors the opportunity to make the 
changes they had advocated since the inception of the Constitution. 
They realized too late that they did not control the Council of Censors 
except during the earliest period, and to hope for the Constitutionalists 
to do anything but uphold the fundamental law was wishful thinking. 
Radical control of the Censors was such that they used it as a propaganda 
vehicle. They had such sufficient success with this tactic that they 
were able to have the voters repudiate the Conservatives at the next 
election. With the return of the Radicals to power, many of the acts of 
the Conservative Assemblies were overturned with impunity. 
The long complaint. of \\Tilliam Moore against the Assembly now receive·g. 
a wide and respectful hearing. The Assembly restored to the Council--
even with a Conservative, Dickinson, as President--the appointive power 
they had held prior to 1782. They rescinded the law which pennitted the 
drawing of warrants on the Treasury by any appointee of the Assembly and 
again placed this in the hands of the President and the Council. They 
fixed the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court for the whole of 
their tenure. 124 
One of the most vexing problems the Radical Assanbly faced was the 
huge debt owed to Pennsylvanians by the United States. There was 
'I general agreement by both parties that this debt should be funded, but 
,,, 
124 Minutes' of the G7neral Assembl! d£ the Conmonwealth of Penns~lvania •• , 1784-1785 Session, February 7, 1785, February 22, 1785, ~· rch 17, · 1785, ~larch IB, 1785, April 2, 1785, 79-81, 88-89, 223-224, 226-228, 280-282. 
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d~c,ided disagreement on the method to be used. The Radicals felt that 
·tl1e State sl1ould take the initiative because Congress had failed to 
provide a plan in their last session. They plarmed to asstnne all the 
debt and pay the interest by se.lling public lands, instituting a new 
general tax program, and issµing more paper money. Dickinson disagreed, 
and in a lengthy message to the Assembly argued that such procedures 
\vo.u.l.d ·not accomplish the purpose for tihich they 1vere intended. I-Ie 
.feared that speculators would buy up, at depreciated value, any certifi-\ 
c:a.tes issued for reduction of the debt, and because they could afford 
t.o hold th·em, would wait until the 1noney market ,vas more favorable 
before redeeming them. The very persons the funding measure ,vas intended 
to serve would be the property o,vne_rs wbo would be called on to pay the 
·additional taxes necessary for rec.lempt·ion. 125 ·It is noteworthy that 
the proposals of the Assembly v1oul.d ·have drawn the wrath of the Radicals 
in earlier years, for as Dicki1ts6n predicted, the soft money is-sue was 
highly speculative, and the smaller property ol\rners were, in a s~nse, 
doubly taxed. · Because the new mone.y was not made legal tender, the 
trading interest·s of the State could. :not use it in connnerce, and there· 
was a general economic decli11e. It has been suggested that this ivas one· 
of the reasons for the defeat of the .Radicals and the return of the 
126 sounder money Conservatives to power in the October, 1785 elections. 
The system of securing revenue during the 1784-1785 session was in 
' 
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125 Ibid., December 5, 1785, February 3, 1785, 52-54, 106-107; Dickinson to Assembly, February 1, 1785, Colonial Records, XIV, 328-342. 
126 Bnmhous·e, 176. 
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a chaotic state. Dickinson tried to . provide ideas from whicl1 to, work-; 
first, to simplify the system in sucl1 a way that everyone would be 
taxed equitably and to eliminate loopholes througl1 which funds would I 
be drained off on their way to tl1e Treasury; secondly, to pro.v~de th:e· 
Comptroller-General with a duplicate of all assessments so h·e ,vould 
k110,v 110\v much money to expect, the na11es of the collectors, and the 
names and numbers of those whose truces had been abated or· exempted. 
\~ith such a system, the taxpayer would know that his money ,\fas not 
being diverted, and with the publication of e,xpenditures, he would know 
how it was being spent. Dickinson saw a.11 .increased cost of collection, 
but an even greater i11crease in revenue.~ A.loost as a footnote to these 
suggestions, Dickinson indicated that :he :was submitting a draft of a 
bill to correct some minor abuses. ·TI1i.s did not provo·k_e· :the· ·Assembly 
to the kind of response the Council rec:eiv_ed during: :tzf;ed'·s tenn. Instea.d 
the Asse1nbly simply chose to ignore it.: 127 
During the spring and early summer, the Council .di<l little e"xcept 
pay bills, listen to complaints, and trust that enough people would pay· 
their taxes to keep the State from. becoming totally bankrupt. It was 
during this lull that Dickinson followed up on his earlier suggested 
transfer of sovereignty. It ,vas becoming more apparent that the Articl~s 
left something to be desired, and the President urged t11e Assembly .. ·to 
seek iinproveme11ts to strengthen them. Because of the language used, it 
127 Dickins-on. :tel. A:$_sembly, February 9, 1785, Colonial Records, XI'l,349-352. 
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~an. be suigested that such improveme11ts would be a prelude to a complete 
.revision, for Dickinson stated that ·"partial provision" l\Tould not 
accomplish the purpose. 128 
It is hard to imagine the Radical Assembly making any move that 
would alter the Articles, except when it benefitted them, and they were 
content to accept the message without conment. In Nove1nber, Dickinson 
retired from the Council to be succeeded by Benjamin Franklin who had 
recently returned from France. The Radical Assembly ,vas replaced by a 
rejuvenated Conservative majority. 
yr·_.. The Decline of The Council 
The Suprern.~- Executive Council as an instnim~nt o.f government began 
._its real declin~- ·tn 1786. lt was unable to sustaina: t:he vigor of the 
previous three years, and at, -no. time was there the :kind .of enthusiasm 
which prevailed during Reed's administration. This- was ·.due, in part, 
because tl1e kind of leadership provided by Reed and Dickinson was 
lacking; in ~art because the problems of war and those arising irrnnediately 
in the post-war period were being placed in the background and reduced 
' 
the challenge for leadership; and finally because factionalism and party 
division in the Council and Assembly did not provide the opportunity for 
l 
a strong leader except as a person decided to exercise leadership • 
... 
128 Dickinson to,_Assembly, August 25, 1785,- ibid., xrv,' 523. 
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Franklin, elected President almost by acclamation, was ill most of his 
tenn, and Charles Biddle, the Vicei:tPresident, did not feel free to 
take strong positions on questions of importance. Indeed, Biddle stated 
that ''nothing ••• of any consequence was done ••• without consulting him 
[Franklin]". 129 
During this latter period, attention was centered on the meetings 
held to alter the Articles, and the Council's relationship to the 
Assembly was almost as though it was an independent body, without any 
meaning •. There were very few suggestions made to the Assembly and none 
of those made were of a revolutionary nature. The Assembly, in turn. 
was providing nothing that was challenging, except to give a political 
education to a small group of Radicals, who were to put forth the really 
sound arguments against the adoption of the proposed Constitution of the 
United States. To that one champion of Radicalism in the Assembly, 
Robert Whitehill, were now added the voices of John Smiley and William 
Findley. All three had been on the Council at one time or another, but 
their real contribution to the Radical position was made during the debate 
in Pennsylvania on the acceptance of the Constitution. Theirs was a 
losing cause, however. partly because they were outnumbered and the Con-
servative detennination was too great for them. More than this, the 
political climate had changed from an emphasis on freedom to desire for 
stability. Their Radicalism was not without merit, but they lacked one 
129 Charles Biddle, .Autobio8raphl (Philadelphia, 1883), 198. 
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of the most important ingredients of govenunent--the ability to com-
pranise. 130 · 
The acceptance of the new Federal Constitution posed several problems 
for the ColUlcil. They could not detennine where their responsibilities 
left off and the new law took over. Tiie passage of the first import 
duty law by the new Congress left the Council in a quandry as to whether 
the earlier imposts prescribed by Pennsylvania law were still valid. The 
Pemsylvania Supreme Court, when asked to provide an opinion, ruled that 
the federal laws superceded the State laws. 131 Many of the duties and 
responsibilities that had been the concern of the State were now taken 
over by the new Federal Government, which prompted some to suggest that 
the State Constitution would have to be revised. Ultimately, the Conserva-
tives got their new Constitution, but for an entirely different reason than 
that originally advanced. It included separation of powers, a bicameral 
legislature and a s~gle executive primarily because the Federal Con-
stitution provided these on a Federal level, not because it was the most 
desirable thing for PeJU1Sylvanians. Early in 1790;- some ·members of the 
Cowicil were still resisting what was to prove inevitable, but their action 
at this distance seems more of a retreat with honor than resistance. They 
recognized that the day of the Council was past, and that a new era was 
on the horizon, but were determined to leave the field W1bowed. 
13° For a representative view of the Radical position, see J.B. Mc.Master 
and F. D. Stone:, eds., Penn~i,lvania and the Federal Constitution, 
1787-1788 {Philadelphia 0 11rn~) o · ··· ., 
131 Colonial Records, August 8, 1789, XVI, 356. 
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,,. VII.· Conclusion 
The ColDlCil and the Assembly were both great political schools for 
PeIU1Sylvanians who would participate in the new govenunents. state and 
national. The Cowicil held the State together during a period of great 
political and social upheaval, and made a solid contribution to democratic 
concepts. There were many who were familiar with the political theories 
of the time, but the rough.and tumble of political involvement gave the 
theories,some authority. 
The Supreme Executive ColDlcil played a dual role during the period 
of the first Pennsylvania Constitutio~. It was a restraining force on 
an Assembly frequently composed of men who were well-intentioned, but 
not experienced in the ways of fonnal government. Members of the Council 
were also in constant co111nwiication with their constituents, and were 
better infonned about their political attitudes. Because of this lmowledge, 
the Cotnlcil was able to feed ideas and suggestions to the Assanbly which 
it felt were necessary to maintain the general well-being of the State. 
Men of the quality of Reed and Dickinson made many solid contributions to 
government, and others, while not measuring up to these men, were of 
sufficient knowledge and character to prevent a collapse into chaos, even 
though there were times when this appeared inminent. Experience in the 
Assembly and the Cotmcil gave good political training, and the leadership 
provided by the Cotmcil pennitted the implementation of representative 
· democratic govennnent. 
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Born in Chicago, Illinois, March 9, 1919, Burton 
R. Holmes was educated in the Chicago public schools. 
Upon graduation from high school, he worked for a large 
printing firm prior to his enrollment in Illinois, Wesleyan 
University in Bloomington, Illinois. Prior to graduation,· 
he was drafted to do work of national importance of a civil-
ian nature due to _his conscientious objections to serving 
in the armed forces Returning to college after the war, he 
received his B.A.degree from Roosevelt University in 1948. 
He has been employed in the printing industry since, and 
is currently plant man~ger in the Middle Atlantic region. 
Married to the former Naomi Peterman, he is the fat.:he·r 
of a teen-age son. 
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